Knowledge
Platform
**Security &
Rule of Law**

Hard Contexts, Hard Choices

4th Annual Conference

Summary report | May 2016

Platform 2016 programmatic & research priorities

The 4th Annual Conference of the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law aimed to contribute to setting the Platform's 2016 programmatic and research agenda by building on prior research, activities and programmatic focus, while adopting a forward-looking approach to incorporate emerging challenges.

Under the "Hard Contexts, Hard Choices" banner, three main themes guided the agenda of the Conference and provide, together with its outcomes, the basis for the Platform's upcoming programmatic and research priorities:

- Which balance to adopt in addressing current and emerging transnational security challenges?;

- Towards more politically transformative rule of law support: working through informal justice systems and challenging state led injustices;
- Innovation in Security and Rule of Law programming.

1. Which balance to adopt in addressing current and emerging transnational security challenges?

The world is faced with tremendous security challenges related to large-scale transnational organized crime, radicalization and political extremism, growing threats by non-State armed actors and mass population movements. Declining aid budgets and an increasing donor focus on refugee crisis response have implications for the prioritization in humanitarian, security and development interventions as well as the resulting quality and scale of these interventions. Increasing attention is directed towards short-term security needs as perceived by the Western donor community, including border control and counter-terrorism. This occurs to the detriment of responding to underlying causes of conflict and long-term development challenges, the apparent need for sustainable investment in inclusive and just societies as well as a coherent and durable response to the refugee crisis that fully acknowledges the interconnectedness between the refugee crisis, aggressive foreign policies, violent conflict, politicized and/or misspent ODA, and exploitative economics.

PRIORITIES

- Mindful of lessons learned of our policies and programming, how could donor-supported security programmes developed to control and regulate mass population movements, be designed so as to be more responsive to the causes, dynamics and consequences of migration and displacement, in a manner that is conflict-sensitive and aware of existing power structures.
- Moving beyond law enforcement and humanitarian band-aids: addressing underlying drivers and locally grounded understandings of instability, injustice and violent extremism (eg. political, socio-economic marginalization and exclusion) in order to foster inclusive State-building policy and practice, within a rule of law framework.
- How to effectively deal with non-State armed actors in terms of mass atrocity prevention, engagement in peace negotiations, and political participation.

2. Towards more politically transformative rule of law support: working through informal justice systems and challenging state led injustices

Over the past decade, rule of law support has become an established element of the support package offered to countries in all stages of a conflict cycle, in order to either prevent, stop or deal with a history of violence, whereby the main focus lays on "access to justice" for citizens. Experiences in this field as well as the lessons that can be drawn from the evolution of revolutions and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa, have shed light on important blind spots. In light of the SDGs, in particular Goal 16, opportunities have arisen to move beyond the minimum standard they set and to take advantage of this momentum to craft the best possible policies.

A heavier policy focus seems to be needed on informal justice mechanisms, as these tend to increase access to justice and are often perceived as more legitimate in the eyes of the local population. Many however perpetuate or exacerbate forms of discrimination and exclusion which need to be grappled with, and flourish due to the shortcomings of the formal State mechanisms themselves.

Neither formal, nor informal justice systems are capable of dealing with crimes perpetrated with the complicity of the State, in particular in contexts where institutions serve the interests of those occupying the state. Yet, these are injustices that nurture social unrest and conflict. So far, little attention is drawn to this fact, let alone that there are practical entry points for addressing it. The Platform would like to spark a discussion to explore ways to address the blind spot of State injustices.

PRIORITIES

- Informal justice systems: How to work with, rather than around, local realities through informal justice mechanisms so as to explore novel approaches to support them?
- State injustices: How to develop different approaches which tackle the creation of injustice by economic and social elites, rather than by working around it through technical approaches only, which contribute to fueling a key driver of conflict?
- How to advance peace and justice in a manner that connects global norms with people's actual needs and capacities in a locally appropriate and sensitive manner?

3. Innovative approaches to security & rule of law programming

In spite of significant international engagement and funding in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, expected outcomes have not materialized. In the context of the SDGs, how can we move beyond shortcuts in the international community's response and undertake actions which have a real impact, rather than resorting to interventions which look like they are effective but of which we know they will not be? And how to do so by navigating the increasing constraints imposed by shrinking civic and political space?

Contemporary insights on iterative program design which balance accountability, transparency and impact, while focusing on political feasibility, testing, learning and the incorporation of feedback loops will be taken as a baseline to discuss current challenges for our policy and programming.

PRIORITIES

- How to best develop flexible, adaptive, and politically-savvy justice and security programming that takes account of risk taking, for impact to be likely in highly complex settings?
- How to better connect donor and local accountability? And how to balance accountability and learning, in an environment where organizational learning cultures are nurtured?
- How to integrate conflict analyses and gender analyses and avoid common pitfalls in designing, monitoring, and evaluating gender-sensitive research, policies and programs.
- How to optimize the use of data in planning, monitoring and learning?

Platform 2016 Annual Conference outcomes

At the Platform's 4th Annual Conference, around 180 researchers, policy makers and practitioners from across the world gathered to bring to the surface the key features of today's "hard contexts" and explored the "hard choices" that security and rule of law policy, programming and knowledge exchange in such fragile contexts require.

Organized with the close collaboration of 32 Platform member organizations, participants had the opportunity to pick from a menu of 24 breakout sessions. Structured according to three main guiding themes, the sessions resulted in the key insights and priorities laid out in this section. This comprehensive overview has provided the basis for the identification of the Platform's 2016 programmatic and research priorities.

Participants were welcomed by *George Mukundi Wachira* (Member of the Platform's Steering Group and Head of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, African Union Commission), who introduced the aims of the day and highlighted some key challenges for the participants to take on board in their discussions during the day.

The Conference's keynote conversation zoomed in on the overarching challenges that arise when operating in hard contexts and featured *Simone Filippini* (Managing Director – Cordaid), *Kathryn Nwajiaku-Dahou* (Head - International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Secretariat - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), *Katy Thompson* (Rule of Law, Justice & Security Specialist - United Nations Development Program), *Jelte van Wieren* (Director - Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid Department, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and *Cheryl Frank* (Head -Transnational Threats and International Crime Division - Institute for Security Studies).

Dilemmas between technical support and political change processes were reflected upon, as well as trade-offs between perceived short-term security needs and sustained processes of inclusive political change and development in order to chart the way forward.

Global thinking and solutions to respond to these challenges is essential, as is financing for development. Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) seeks to "promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels". Yet, work remains to be done to decide on the extent to which the Agenda asks the international community to cooperate and step up its investment into preventative strategies.

To re-imagine the future, international community must place stronger emphasis on strategies for implementation; enhanced cooperation and inclusion; better coordinated, long-term and strategic approaches to advance state-building; and importantly, effective leadership.

1. Which balance to adopt in addressing current and emerging transnational security challenges?

Non-state actor mass violence: how to mitigate their unjust harms?

Key insights

Atrocities by non-state armed actors (NSAs) are a growing threat and the response of states in recent years has been marked by a range of challenges. Indeed, many of the methods used to combat atrocities committed by conventional states – such as diplomacy, targeted humanitarian and development assistance, and sanctions – are not nearly as successful when confronting the instability and injustice that NSAs engender.

Failing to deal adequately with state actors' atrocities also can create a more permissive environment for NSAs to commit mass atrocities. Policies and means to tackle enablers of mass atrocities, that perpetuate cycles of violence, are equally lacking in most countries.

Stepping up the involvement of regional actors is especially important. Publicly naming NSAs who commit mass atrocities can be another useful avenue. In this respect, attention should be paid not only to killings, but also to the prevention of other types of harms, including slavery, abduction, displacement, and rape. Meanwhile, the role of religion in general, and Islam specifically, in the commission of mass atrocities by non-State actors is up for debate.

PRIORITIES

- How should the international community tailor a combination of mass atrocity prevention tools towards non-State actors and their enablers to create adequate incentives, which are cognizant of their respective motives (eg. gaining territory, wealth, or imposing (religious) beliefs)?
- What role can non-violent resistance play in the prevention of and response to mass atrocities?
- Under which circumstances are NSAs most likely to negotiate?
- Compared to state-led humanitarian interventions, how effective is the provision of support to non-State armed actors to advance humanitarian objectives?

Organized by
- Strategy for Humanity, The Hague Institute for Global Justice & Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael Institute
    - Facilitator: Charles Brown, Managing Director - Strategy for Humanity
    - Guest Expert: Eamon Aloyo, Senior Researcher – The Hague Institute for Global Justice & Diana Goff, Research Fellow – Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael Institute

Peace within reach: Lessons from Colombia, Burundi & Libya

Key insights

Insiders to various peace processes assessed prospects and lessons for peace. In Colombia, the peace talks are reaching their final stages in Havana, Cuba, prior to the presentation of an agreement to the Colombian public that might just put an end to the currently longest running conflict. Their successful completion and proper implementation are the most important pathways to peace, as they will put an end to the interlinkages between politics

and violence. Both a comprehensive security system that permits political participation, and the transition of the FARC into a regular political entity are contested issues that remain to be solved.

In spite of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000 that ended years of ethnic violence in Burundi, political instability remains a reality to date. The lack of political will to build consensus and the ruling party's trouble in transitioning from a rebel group to a political party, committed to good governance, have precluded Arusha's successful implementation. The development of a democratic culture within, and between, political parties, as well as the promotion of an inclusive political dialogue to foster political settlements are essential for peace, still possible in Burundi.

Meanwhile in Libya, the UN-backed Government of National Acord has been established. In light of the non-inclusion of certain military factions within the peace talks and the on-going armed conflict, the government had to enter Libya by boat instead of by plane. While a temporary agreement bans armed conflict from Tripoli, future peace efforts must engage armed factions in dialogue so as to secure their buy-in for a ceasefire and reach a legitimate agreement that can be successfully implemented. A comprehensive agreement requires a level of stability not currently present in the divided country but must address immediate concerns regarding security sector reform and democratic state-building.

PRIORITIES

- Relevant political factions need to be included in the negotiation and implementation of peace processes. The successful disarmament and reintegration of former armed forces into mainstream politics is key to ensure (good) governance.
- The international community plays a positive role in the coming into being of peace agreements but must remain engaged so as to ascertain proper implementation.

Organized by

- Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael Institute & SESRIC
  - Facilitator: Heleen Schrooyen, Senior Program Manager - Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
  - Guest experts: Juan Fernando Londoño, Former Deputy-Minister of Interior of Colombia, Expert on the peace process & Director – Center for Analysis of Public Affairs, Fabien Nsengimana, Executive Director - Burundi Leadership Training Program & Mustafa el Sagezli, General Manager – Libyan Programme for Reintegration and Development & Chairman of the Board – Statistical, Economic and Social Research & Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC)

Rule of law reform in protracted crises

Key insights

How should the provision of rule of law, justice and security be ensured in areas that are evolving from humanitarian crises and emergency situations towards development contexts? Examples from Afghanistan, Burundi and Rwanda underline complexities in programming. Gender-based violence is a case in point where such an overlap between humanitarian needs and development assistance is increasing from a justice and rule of law perspective.

PRIORITIES

- Means to tackle policy and programming in development contexts where humanitarian needs remain acute need to be examined.
- Rather than following uni-linear models, rule of law reform efforts need to be differentiated in function of political and cultural specificities and diverging phases of respective transitions.

Organized by

- International Development Law Organization, Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael Institute, The Hague Institute for Global Justice
  - Facilitator: Thea Hilhorst, Professor of Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction – Institute for Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam
  - Guest expert: Marco Lankhorst, Head of Research – International Development Law Organization

Addressing drivers of radicalization: social and economic marginalization

Key insights

The type of terrorism we witness today, both in the Middle East and elsewhere, is a consequence of cultures that have evolved as the result of increased Western intervention, Sagezli argued by discussing Libya's history as an example. Overwhelmingly, Islamic countries feel that Western powers are disregarding long-term perspectives by only communicating with pro-European governments in the region, at the expense of other segments of society that become excluded. As these governments often do not have any presence beyond the major cities, Western powers further alienate parts of society.

In addition, Islamic cultures often feel significant disappointment when comparing their current state of development with their history as the cradle of civilization. Radicalization is not however only a product of economic, but also of political exclusion.

For instance, prior to IS, Syria's economic and educational development was relatively good, but many youth did not trust the political system and felt excluded.

At the individual level, people may experience difficult or negative life events (such as victimization) that they need to make sense of and provide meaning to. By doing so, they become part of people's life stories and are incorporated into their narrative identity, which provides handles on how to behave.

PRIORITIES

- Victimological processes need to be studied further through a narrative framework that helps us understand why people radicalize, all the while looking at the individual stories in relation to the larger cultural (meta) narrative. Such an approach may be difficult as concerned areas can be dangerous to access.
- The role of women needs to be studied, as they can be both at risk and play a protective role, as well as the contribution of education, including possible reforms to Islamic education.
- All concerned parties need to be involved in State building efforts in order to vaccinate against extremism and avoid exclusion. Development workers for instance ought to take more risks when working on the ground so as to reach out to radicalized groups. Working with de-radicalized groups would also be helpful as it can assist in sending the message that individuals can still be re-integrated into society.
- Formal and informal networks that surround radicalizing individuals play an important role in prevention.
- 50 million jobs are needed in the MENA region to create a vibrant economy, which requires a cultural change that attaches more value to entrepreneurship.

Organized by
- SPARK, SESRIC & Intervict-Tilburg University
  - Facilitator: Rob Sijstermans, Training & Research Fellow - Clingendael Institute
  - Guest experts: Mustafa el Sagezli, Chair of the Board – SESRIC, & General Manager – Libyan Program for Reintegration & Development, Fadi Farsin, Researcher – SESRIC, Yannick du Pont, Director – SPARK & Pauline van Eck-Aarten, Assistant Professor – Intervict, Tilburg University

Citizens seeking security in MENA: the intersection of local demands and international responses

Key insights

Local demands of populations seeking everyday security amidst the turbulence unleashed by the Arab Spring are rarely reflected in international security and state-building policy and practice. Rather, international priorities (border control, stemming migration, countering violent extremism) often undercut the effect of local efforts to access security, and become "urgent" when North Atlantic interests are threatened—not (necessarily) when local people perceive a "crisis". Divisions within local communities (ethnic, sectarian) and civil society themselves also play a role in obstructing these processes for collectively identifying security priorities and local co-optation commonly masquerades as local engagement.

Currently, States, often authoritarian or unrepresentative, are benefitting disproportionately from the international framing of and investments addressing security threats in MENA. This represents a disappointing but predictable subordination of the international community's values to its short-term interests. Paradoxically however, opportunities for local actors to exert leverage are strongest in most acute situations—i.e. fast-changing humanitarian contexts where international actors need access.

Challenges

What does "partnership" between international and local actors really mean? Might "negotiation" be a more accurate term? And is it realistic to expect that partnerships between international and local actors of wildly differing scales and financial capabilities could be pursued as relations of equality?

What is really a "good" local partner? Is it one with proper internal controls and financial management, or one with meaningful local legitimacy, a clear mandate, etc.? And can international actors avoid undermining these rare "good" local partners by overwhelming them with interest and support?

Overall, can civil society be regarded as a legitimate representative of citizen needs and demands in MENA? Similarly, the "international community" encompasses a broad spectrum of actors, not all of which are Western (i.e. Iranian and Gulf influence in MENA has grown since Arab Spring), and whose motives and interests are diverse. In this context, local actors are learning to shop around for advantage.

PRIORITIES

- How can international actors engage local partners as equals in identifying security priorities?
- More research and analysis of security from an end-user perspective is needed—i.e.,

how do citizens seek security (formally and informally), and who do they seek protection from?

- Locally grounded understandings of security relate to livelihoods and social protection as much as to the security sector; this must be taken into account in state-building policy and practice.
- Destabilization caused by radicalization is a result of youth alienation and limited opportunities, a fact currently left unaddressed by much of the state-centric security assistance (such as CVE) in MENA.
- There has been very poor external analysis of the underlying grievances that fueled the Arab Spring, which risks emergence of an "Arab Spring 2.0" because root causes have not been addressed.

Organized by
- PAX & Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael Institute
  - Facilitator: Michael Warren, Program Manager - PAX & Megan Price, Research Fellow - Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael Institute
  - Guest experts: Mehdi Barhoumi, Projects Manager - International Alert, Mariam Younes, Research Coordinator - Lebanon Support, Marie-Noëlle Abi Yaghi, President & Head of Research - Lebanon Support & Arne Musch, Business Unit Manager Europe, Middle East & North Africa – VNG International

CVE & radicalization: emerging challenges and dilemmas

Key insights

Since 9/11, there has been a constant increase in the number of victims of violent extremism. Groups such as al-Qaida, ISIS, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab have managed to hold ground despite international counter-terrorism efforts. The notion of countering violent extremism (CVE) has gained increasing traction amongst State actors in particular since 2015. The UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism has been adopted and invites key actors to take responsibility and work together.

The challenges political decision-makers and practitioners encounter in tackling radicalization stem from the lack of an internationally accepted definition of both terrorism and violent extremism. The root causes of the phenomenon need to be addressed, which also relate to organized crime. Motives that turn individuals into violent extremists are multifaceted and extremely complex. They include personal motivations and convictions, as well as negative experiences of exclusion, marginalization, rejection, humiliation, injustice, or frustration.

In exploring possible responses, the power of dialogue is significant as it enables us to map what radicalizes people. How to precisely balance the criminalization of hate speech and

freedom of expression and what is the impact of accountability measures, in terms of effectiveness and the moral message they send remain up for debate.

PRIORITIES

- CVE/PVE strategies must not be limited to programs at the individual or community level, but also take into account structural causes and be undertaken within a rule of law framework, as violent extremism is a rule of law violation.
- Programs cannot simply be copy-pasted from one context to another – as an example, there clearly is a difference between attacks committed in conflict and non-conflict zones.
- Initiatives with too much government involvement may be counterproductive, thus space must be left for communities and civil society actors to develop their own.
- More attention needs to be paid to State terrorism within the international community, and to where resources are allocated.

Organized by
- Human Security Collective & International Centre for Counter Terrorism
  - Facilitators: Fulco van Deventer, Deputy Director – Human Security Collective & Marco de Swart, Senior Portfolio Manager – International Centre for Counter Terrorism

Youth migration from West Africa: unpacking our assumptions

Key insights

Many of the underlying motivators of migration, whether it be voluntary or forced, regular or irregular, economic or political, overlap. Understanding public and political assumptions regarding migration streams, both at home and abroad, is important in our societies where populism and changing perceptions have reduced policymakers' maneuverability. The arrival of many migrants on the European shores has shifted the focus to securitized management, ramping up border police, building fences, keeping people out. Current politicized discussions on (youth) migration are very detrimental to working towards a solution that deals with causes rather than symptoms. Young people in West Africa are disproportionately affected by this shift, because it results in less available resources for development projects in the region.

Many problematic assumptions underlie Western approaches, including the fact that creating more jobs, for instance in West Africa, will reduce migration. While job opportunities will encourage development and improve personal security, this does not translate into job

satisfaction. Youth remain disillusioned by their inability to break into (primarily) white-collar sectors that are more desirable. Development efforts should balance "supply" and "demand" – not only providing training, loans and coaching, but also target sectors where there are opportunities, such as ICT and agriculture. Additionally, a substantial proportion of migrants are those who can afford to pay smugglers, meaning that employment can also encourage migration. The challenge is to create jobs that are desirable and offer viability for stability and future growth. This is sometimes a problem with work in the informal sector in particular, because it is more ad-hoc and demand-driven in nature.

Another assumption that underlies many development efforts, including those aimed at youth in West Africa, is a focus on "technical" programs to address causes of migration. Creating effective programs requires not only technical know-how, but also an understanding of the politics of communities in which programs exist. Engaging political leaders can enhance the outcomes of development programs – by creating further opportunities, providing necessary resources, lending legitimacy to these programs, etc. The Dutch MFA has been promoting efforts that engage local leaders and espouse local ownership of youth development processes. Challenges remain: corruption is a threat; abuse of power; losing the appearance of independence.

PRIORITIES

- Which factors are most important to youth in their job search (stability, pay, growth opportunities, prestige or something else altogether?) and how can their preferences for certain sectors be taken into account? The Netherlands specifically target "top sectors" that are exported to other countries. While Dutch expertise can encourage better development in these sectors, are they areas in which young people want to become involved? If more opportunities are available in different sectors that are less desirable, can these perceptions be changed?
- How can donors, like the EU or the Netherlands, challenge underlying assumptions in their work to address youth issues in West Africa and beyond? Does this require grassroots efforts, more involvement of local political leaders, or a more centralized approach? And what role should NGOs take on and how is it different from that played by local and foreign governments, corporations or other actors?
- What must be done to strike a balance in youth development projects between technical "knowledge" and finding political support? Does engaging with the political context in which the projects operate foster legitimacy among youth – or does their disillusionment with local/national politics encourage further skepticism?

Organized by
- SpringFactor & Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael Institute
  - Facilitator: Marije Balt, Director – SpringFactor

- Guest expert: Fransje Molenaar, Research Fellow - Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael Institute

2. Towards more politically transformative rule of law support

Reconciling international peace and justice norms with local needs

Key insights

What are the opportunities and challenges presented by the SDGS in general, and SDG 16 in particular? Amongst a selection of available data, certain indicators demonstrate that considerable progress has been made as regards longer-term Goal 16 issues. However, the same data tells us that in recent years, the world has witnessed certain substantial set-backs. How this data is interpreted is key.

Nonetheless, we must not become cynical about the challenges and dangers presented by the SDGs. It is extremely important we first acknowledge how revolutionary it is that so many states have formally agreed on an interdependent agenda replete with issues that were missing from previous frameworks. The SDGs present several opportunities: the holistic approach the agenda adopts towards the interlinked issues within Goal 16; the political momentum it has generated; the promise of new data and tracking; and the long-term horizon to work towards. As the SDGs only set a minimum standard, now is the time to take advantage of the momentum and push ourselves to create the best possible policies, including by getting the indicators right so as to avoid they create perverse incentives

How can these international peace and justice norms be meaningfully reconciled with local needs and perceptions? Justice is a complex concept with contextual meanings, and if we are serious about it, we need to grapple with these local specificities as much as we do with global notions of justice. That said, justice can be a convening area for global action on peace and security issues. But to make it meaningful and move beyond normative, top-down and typical rule of law prescriptions, slightly different framing is required. For example, it is interesting that there seems to be a correlation between people's experiences of injustice and an increased likelihood of violence. Research in i.a. Kyrgyzstan shows that these experiences go far beyond the rule of law and are to do with health, education, governance and economic deficits amongst many other things.

PRIORITIES

- If people's needs go beyond the limits of rule of law programming, so must our responses, and Goal 16, for it to be meaningful.
- Treating injustice as a multi-stakeholder problem to be solved by focusing more on

local experiences of injustice, and committing to understand what they are, how they are caused, and how they relate to conflict dynamics in every context, might offer ways to work on peace and justice issues that connect normative global norms with people's actual needs and capacities in a locally appropriate and sensitive manner.

- Should the focus lay on outcomes or is process-driven development a better way to eventually reach the right outcomes?

Organized by
- Saferworld
  - Facilitators: William Bennett & Thomas Wheeler, Conflict and Security Advisors - Saferworld

New ways to tackle state-crime: lessons from Guatemala

Key insights

Guatemala made headlines worldwide last year when its President and Vice-President were forced to resign after months of street-protests against government corruption. Compelling evidence was produced thanks to CICIG, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala. High-level state crime is of growing concern across the globe, making the success of this unique mechanism and lessons learned for its potential replication in other contexts affected by criminalized states all the more relevant.

International staff can act as co-prosecutors and investigators in high-profile cases, whilst Guatemalan judges apply Guatemalan law. The Commission is also mandated to propose legislative reform and to denounce corruption in the judiciary. Its results include amongst others the removal of a corrupt Attorney General on two occasions and the dismantling of numerous organized crime groups.

A few challenges need to be born in mind. It was the US that pushed for the CICIG's continuation, demonstrating its dependence on such external circumstances. In a polarized context like Guatemala's, the risk of judicial powers being politicized is also substantial. Political consequences have not been unambiguous either. As a result of CICIG's denouncing government corruption, apparent outsider Jimmy Morales got elected President. Whether the political consequences are ultimately beneficial to the country remains to be seen. Notwithstanding these imperfections, CICIG is the first of many international cooperation mechanisms in Guatemala to have had a fundamentally positive impact. While time is needed and gains are not irreversible, the creation of institutional capacity and dismantling of parallel structures within the State already has a clearly felt impact on the culture of Impunity.

PRIORITIES

- How to ensure domestic ownership, the development of domestic capacity and a sound strategy towards mandate completion so as to ensure that sustainable capacities are in place once investigative commissions leave?
- How to ensure that investigative commissions dispose of the appropriate tools and acquire an understanding of the political map, including potential allies and priority targets, which is essential to navigate confronting not only criminals but also economic and social elites and State officials in other contexts where the CICIG model may be replicated?
- External political pressure is key to bring into being and ensure the success of investigative commissions. Insulating them from negative political influences is needed to reduce their vulnerability and requires a sufficiently long mandate.
- Rather than being sui generis bodies (in the instance of CICIG, created by treaty between the UN and the host state), investigative commissions need to be official UN organs.

Organized by
- Impunity Watch & Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael Institute
  - Facilitator: Marlies Stappers, Executive Director - Impunity Watch
  - Guest experts: Alejandro Rodríguez, Guatemalan Lawyer and expert on the CICIG, Daniel Saxon, Assistant Professor - Leiden University & Ivan Briscoe, Senior Research Fellow - Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael Institute

Linking formal and informal justice in fragile and conflict-affected settings

Key insights

Benefits
The limited success of state systems reinforces reasons why people resort to local sources of dispute resolution. The state is often absent, and if justice is delivered, it is often delayed and ineffective. General consensus around the benefits of engaging with informal justice systems exists, as they can be swift in making decisions while statutory courts can take much longer to reach a ruling. Practical reasons such as cost, approachability and proximity further encourage people to engage.

In this context, which strategies to pursue to strengthen informal justice? Informal and formal systems could be linked, either by incorporating informal courts into a formal hierarchy, or by

improving communication between the two systems. Customary law could also be transformed from within, by fostering internal accountability and mobilizing communities for them to reach decisions on changes to customary law.

Challenges

However, access to courts does not equate access to access to justice: we should not idealize informal justice. It can be susceptible to exclusionary norms, problems of enforceability, lack of uniformity in application, abuse and discrimination, particularly against women. In South Sudan, women plaintiffs are susceptible to intersectional discrimination, involving socio-economic and marital status, as well as their connections within the community.

Practitioners should engage with and support informal justice, but need to better understand how. There is more research than practice. That informal justice systems are complex is well understood, but there is a need to more clearly establish what works. Future programming should take into account theories of change and context specificities in order to better engage informal systems.

PRIORITIES

- How to improve current programming, bearing in mind that at times, it claims to engage with customary law while still promoting state law, and heavily relies on training, which mirrors state-centric approaches? Gaps in knowledge on theories of change and efficient interventionism should be examined.
- How can formal and informal systems be linked without compromising value and meaning in local contexts, all the while ensuring human rights standards are met? Should this link be achieved through a national legal framework that makes room for informal justice mechanisms, or should connections be made at the local level? If informal systems are inconsistent, how can/should they be organized?
- Should donors have a policy on informal justice systems and what should it look like?

Organized by
- Van Vollenhoven Institute, International Development Law Organization & Cordaid
  - Facilitator: Marco Lankhorst, Head of Research – International Development Law Organization
  - Guest experts: Suliman Ibrahim, Senior Researcher - Van Vollenhoven Institute and Benghazi University, Hélène Flaam, Researcher - University of Ghent, Carolien Jacobs, Assistant Professor - Van Vollenhoven Institute, Bruno Braak, Researcher - Van Vollenhoven Institute, Stephanie Joubert, Program Officer – Cordaid & Karim el Mufti, Senior Researcher on Security and Justice – International Center for Human Sciences – Lebanon

3. Innovation in security & rule of law programming

The new frontier: shifting organizational learning culture

Key insights

Knowledge is important to improve efficiency, remain competitive, guarantee quality, and ensure accountability towards donors and beneficiaries. However, without the institutionalization of knowledge, organizations are likely to repeat past mistakes.

Indeed, the development of an organizational learning culture relies on the following: Creation – transfer – retention of knowledge. Heavy emphasis is currently placed on the generation of knowledge, while little attention going towards its transfer to others and institutionalization. Given turnover rates, this means knowledge often leaves with its creators.

In practice, organizational learning remains a challenge. Fear by staff to admit and discuss mistakes is an inhibiting factor as it is often not "accepted" to acknowledge (let alone discuss) errors. Egos may need to be navigated when not all employees believe in the importance of learning.

Frustration and cynicism regarding the overall functioning of the organization can be another obstacle. Overall, in certain cultures these discussions are taboo as employees risk losing face.

Many activities which are undertaken to improve organizational learning culture take up significant resources while their organizational (as opposed to their individual) benefits remain quite low. Top-down approaches might be resorted to that generate incentives and demand that staff devote a certain amount of their time to learning. A lack of enthusiasm by staff or increased workloads would nevertheless limit the impact of such policies on the institutionalization of knowledge.

PRIORITIES

- Increased attention to the transfer of knowledge (by the means of policies and processes) and to its retention (through systems that ensure sustainability), rather than to its creation alone is essential in order to yield effective, long-term organizational results and establish and organizational learning culture. The development of a vision on organizational learning itself is key.
- Incentives to stimulate organizational learning that generate a limited additional burden should be looked for. As the span of control is limited, focus should lay on the span of influence.
- Stimulating an organizational culture that is open towards discussing failure and

Organized by

- Search for Common Ground
  - Facilitator: Vanessa Corlazzoli, Director of Design, Monitoring and Evaluation - Search For Common Ground

Civil society, networks and policy influencing in security and rule of law reform

Key insights

Benefits

Civil society networks can be powerful agents in influencing policy and promoting effective, sustainable rule of law reform. Civil society organizations (CSOs) offer valuable perspectives to create lasting change and CSO networks supply critical forums for dialogue and exchange around these perspectives. Indeed, they provide for legitimacy, social capital, relationships with other CSOs, and can offer strong management, coordination and collaboration around shared values. Connecting CSOs to a larger network may offer access to decision-makers and global policy arenas, such as the United Nations or other intergovernmental organizations. This allows them to deliver perspectives and recommendations to the international community when they are unable to do so by way of their own governments. They can influence with a stronger voice and take more controversial positions.

Challenges

Benefits of CSO networks may not always be realized and tensions surround their engagement in policy influencing. Uptake of recommendations after research has been completed may be challenging and controversy can surround advocacy positions that are informed by research results. Working with CSOs in fragile states presents real dangers, as many actors are subject to intimidation, abuse and even death for voicing grievances against, for instance, multinational corporations. Progress in fragile states can be easily undermined by new crises (i.e. Ebola outbreak). Countries with governance gaps and weak CSOs capacities also make it difficult to conduct research and hold companies to account for i.a. business-related human rights violations.

In addition, managing a diversity of perspectives in a network is challenging. Working with CSO implementing partners can also create tensions over funding resources as they relate to donor-set agendas and donor cycles, which may, or may not, align with desired objectives from a programmatic standpoint. Donors may be reluctant to support CSO-led rule of law reform given the necessarily political nature of the influence.

Working with CSOs furthermore often means less predictability, as well as less control and influence by donors. The program results tend to be nuanced and more qualitative rather than quantitative. CSO networks in programming require flexible and non-linear approaches instead of traditional project management methods. This extends to the monitoring and evaluation of results. Outcomes finally illustrate that policymakers can be engaged around expert, technical influence rather than through advocacy stances alone.

PRIORITIES

- Where does ownership lie in the uptake of research recommendations? How to translate them into practice, best influence policy, and navigate possible backlash if they are associated with (controversial) advocacy positions in fragile settings?
- With the increasing oppression of civil society and media by governments who may not be receptive to global organizations, how can CSO networks best operate and what type of support can they offer their members?
- How can CSOs contribute to research on the role of the private sector in conflict-affected countries, especially to collect evidence that confirms or rejects the hypothesis that the private sector is contributing to peace and development in a post-conflict setting?

Organized by

- International Development Law Organization, SOMO Centre for Research on Multi-national Corporations, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict & UPEACE
  - Facilitator: Pamela Kovacs, Research & Learning Officer – International Development Law Organization
  - Guest experts: Rens Willems, Research Fellow – UPEACE, Mark van Dorp, Senior Researcher – SOMO Center for Research on Multi-national Corporations & Charlotte Crockett, Program Manager Network Strengthening – Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict

Planning, monitoring and learning: data-driven innovation

Key insights

How to design interventions by using (innovative) technology? Drawing upon largely quantitative methodologies permits reaching a large population sample. While this complicates data collection, it is important to incorporate hard to reach rural and mountainous areas in order to be as representative as possible. To improve data collection efforts, other sources like social media, existing indexes and official statistics can be cross-checked. HiiL's Justice Need Survey gathers them into country-specific "dashboards" to

identify specific justice priorities. Making them open access permits usage by governments and others to identify needs and develop interventions.

Cross-country comparisons of projects furthermore facilitate the monitoring of rule of law programming to foster effective policy implementation and offer citizens greater access to justice. Given the significant influx of new personnel in Embassies, HiiL's Program Generation Tool, for instance, serves as a comprehensive databank to render new employees easily familiar with procedures, processes and measures of existing rule of law programming. It thus serves as "institutional memory". Ideally, embassy personal will first use the dashboard to identify justice needs and subsequently proceed with the program generation tool in order to design interventions. Especially the possibility to allow for cross-country comparisons stimulates the use of 'best practices'.

Additionally, how to measure results by using data-driven innovation? The main problem with monitoring and designing rule of law programs is the complexity of the field. In existing monitoring systems, especially the narratives of the beneficiaries are lacking.

How have the interventions influenced their lives? Sprockler thus uses such narratives as sources to generate data on rule of law programming outcomes, by attempting to combine quantitative and qualitative data.

PRIORITIES

- Data is important as a monitoring tool, however much remains to be done to overcome challenges in effectively linking individual activities to specific program outcomes.
- Engaging with beneficiaries in planning and monitoring allows organizations to acquire a bottom-up view as to the effects of their interventions and has an empowering impact on the beneficiaries themselves, however, how to filter for bias?

Organized by
- Hiil, Oxfam Novib & Sprockler
  - Facilitator: Mariken Gaanderse, Social Entrepreneur – Fonkeling
  - Guest experts: Nele Blommenstein, Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist – Oxfam Novib, Lisette Gast – Sprockler, Kavita Heijstek-Ziemann, Justice Sector Advisor – HiiL & Martin Gramatikov, Head Measuring Justice – HiiL

Problem driven, adaptive and flexible justice and security sector engagement

Key insights

The concept of political economy analysis (PEA) was discussed as a framework to facilitate problem-driven analysis of particular justice or security issues, by drawing upon the justice chain examples of violence against women and pre-trial detention. The exact definition of PEA is important, as it is key which actors, parties and interests are, or are not, included in the analysis. The political aspects of a PEA undertaking, including who performs it, who appoints those who perform it, and what their interests are, have a bearing on how problems are defined, on the basis of what, and whose concerns.

A PEA serves to highlight complexities. Meanwhile, it breaks down a problem to the level of detail where it is possible to identify concrete opportunities for plausible engagement, as well as where political constraints or institutional blockages may make any intervention intractable. Pinpointing decision-making points, and who the relevant actors, incentives and interests are could therefore contribute to realistically mapping entry points for engagement where it is practically and politically feasible to have an impact.

However, PEAs often still remain disconnected from programming decisions, and do not really inform either choices on interventions, nor are they used as live documents to underpin adaptive approaches.

PRIORITIES

- How to ensure that problem-driven political economy analysis (PEA), which unpacks different decision-making logics, can be a useful analytical device that supports the development of a flexible, adaptive base of knowledge that should be integrated and recurring throughout interventions, rather than being a one off action, thereby providing important opportunities for flexible, knowledge-based programming?
- How to prevent a possible bias of a knowledge-base that is owned and supported by external actors – including due to the common recourse to external consultants? The politics of knowledge production in terms of which issues get prioritized needs to be problematized further. How to locate this process much more amongst local actors and national capacities to enable a more contextually grounded understanding of justice and security challenges?
- How to avoid the danger that a PEA becomes one more box to tick, rather than a useful knowledge or learning device? And how to overcome the risk that PEAs lead to interventions that look for low hanging fruit as they are safe, entail less risks in causing any harm, and may be more politically interesting to show results?

Organized by

- Oversees Development Institute
    - Facilitators: *Pilar Domingo & Tam O'Neil, Research Fellows – Overseas Development Institute*

Employment for stability: theory and action

Key insights

Refugees in Lebanon - which is hosting a high number of Syrians who have fled conflict - may be willing to accept lower wages in order to provide for their needs. Community tensions which arise can be caused by (un) employment, a lack of integration, and other factors. In response, large donor agencies such as the World Bank develop employment intervention programmes, with a focus on economic indicators, because they believe that the lack of jobs is at the source of tensions.

Indeed, the assumption is that employment does not only create jobs, it also fosters stability. This draws upon the theory of change whereby employment is linked to individual perceptions and expectations, which can feed into changed social norms regarding violence and conflict, thereby reducing instability.

However, program implementation generates both positive, as well as negative externalities, as observed by cash transfer programs in Kenya, whereby neighbors who did not receive cash-transfers negatively experienced their impact. Similarly, local organizations observe that conflict re-occurs upon the creation of employment. Indeed, poor targeting risks exacerbating perceived inequalities, or even creating new ones, which could worsen or generate new conflicts according to certain theories of change.

If employment is the true source of tensions, but also the solution, do other peacebuilding factors really need to be taken into account? Irrespective of the intervention, they should aim at contributing to the socio-economic dynamics that create stability.

Currently, the lack of programme evaluations is one of the most critical knowledge gaps. Often not all aspects are taken into account, i.a. due to a lack of funding. On average, about 5-10% of budgets is spent on evaluations. A majority of donor agencies perceive interventions to be more important than their evaluation. Attribution is perceived to be difficult in multi-stream programs, but arguably suitable designed M&E may be capable of isolating the unique impacts of employment strategies if there is sufficient desire to do so.

PRIORITIES

- How to best ensure that both positive and negative externalities are adequately taken into account when evaluating employment programs?
- Most interventions developed to create employment focus on economic indicators. However, how to best design, implement and evaluate programs to launch long-term employment interventions, which address socio-economic dynamics that foster prospects for stability?
- Process-evaluation is very context-specific and should be built in and guided by the projects' constituency. How much of budgets should be spend on interventions vs. evaluations and can this be decided prior to implementation in order to know whether a positive impact has been achieved?

Organized by
- The Hague Institute for Global Justice, International Security and Development Center, United Nations University Merit
  - Facilitator: Dr. Neil Ferguson, Researcher - The Hague Institute for Global Justice

Deepening gender perspectives in conflict analysis

Key insights

Benefits
When undertaking gendered conflict analyses, it is key to think about both content and process. That is to say, factors relating to gender need to be included in the analysis ("what questions do we need to ask?"), and the research process itself should ensure the full participation of individuals from all genders and diverse age, ethnic, geographic groups etc. ("who do we need to ask the questions to?").

The integration of a gender-sensitive approach is vital given that men and women experience conflict differently, but also as meaningful participation in the analysis process can help facilitate the inclusive design and implementation of peacebuilding initiatives. Indeed, gender analyses tell us something about all the elements of conventional conflict analyses (i.a. causes, impacts, actors and dynamics).

Challenges
A number of common pitfalls continue to be encountered in how gender is integrated into conflict analyses: treating "gender" as synonymous with "women" or as referring only to gender-based violence; treating "women" and "men" as homogeneous groups; assuming women are victims and men are perpetrators; assuming that talking to women means you

have a gender analysis; focusing on the gendered impacts of conflict, not the gendered drivers of conflict; looking at what people do, not how gendered norms drive behavior; analyzing gender and conflict separately, not how they link to each other; only using the most easily accessible sources (written, or human); assuming that gender norms are static; and failing to look at both the public and private spheres where conflict occurs.

A gendered conflict analysis will vary depending on the motivation that underpins it. From a women's empowerment perspective, it will tend to yield somewhat different data than if trying to understand how gender norms interact with conflict and peace dynamics.

PRIORITIES

- How to manage the need for a detailed gender analysis with the time this requires, the limited funding for what could be a project in itself, and the restricted available time to undertake a conflict analysis? In this context, how to best integrate conflict analyses and gender analyses rather than undertake them separately?
- How to ensure conflict analysis are continually updated rather than being one-off processes?
- More should be done to share information and data between CSOs to enhance efficiency and avoid repetition during research processes, whereby conflict-affected communities become over-consulted.

Organized by
- Saferworld
  - Facilitator: Hannah Wright, Gender, Peace & Security Advisor – Saferworld

4. Skills workshops

How to use the impact pathway and theory of change?

Key insights
The strength of Theories of Change (ToC) lies in the fact that they build on assumptions and incentivize research consortia to critically discuss them. By permitting a real-time evaluation, they constitute a flexible tool that can facilitate learning. Indeed, ToCs should be updated during the course of research projects, which is of particular importance in fragile States given the dynamic nature of these settings.

However, research project outcomes should be realistic and not overly ambitious. It is not possible to control them all. As some outcomes may only become apparent a few years after the completion of projects, it is also important to look back at outcomes at a later stage.

In fragile contexts, are research projects more oriented towards policy than practice? Or does this depend on what funders are looking for (or what researchers assume funders want)? In these settings, having an impact on policy proves to be particularly difficult. Besides, informal systems often play an important role in security and rule of law research. Small steps can however be made first at the practice level.

PRIORITIES

- Increased interaction between policymakers and researchers and discussions on on-going research projects would be useful.
- Research projects should not only focus on the policy level but also seek to have an impact on practice.
- Making available funding to implement tools which are developed during the course of research projects would be helpful.

Organized by
- NWO-WOTRO
    - Facilitator: Han van Dijk, Research Uptake Manager - NWO-WOTRO
    - Guest experts: David Connolly, Head of Program - The Hague Institute for Global Justice

Speed up your research impact

Key insights
When talking with external stakeholders in real life (as well as in the speed-date session), it is important to ask questions: what is he/she doing? In what context is work being carried out and which problems are encountered? Trying to understand the other person's needs before presenting what one has to offer is important in order to find common interests.

Many research projects work with large bureaucratic organizations as stakeholders. Doing so from the outset has the potential to truly benefit their impact. However, building relationships with these individuals requires significant time and effort and there may be regular turnover. Building institutional relationships with these stakeholders and partner organizations is therefore key.

Political parties and policy makers are important stakeholders for security and rule of law research projects. Building relationships on the basis of trust where open exchanges are possible is nonetheless particularly difficult. Taking these individuals out of their day-to-day contexts, for instance by the means of trainings that gathers policymakers from different countries and provide for space to talk more freely have proven successful as relationships that are built as such can indeed be beneficial at a later stadium of the project.

Conducting research in fragile contexts may expose partner organizations and research respondents to serious risks. It is therefore extremely important for research consortia to identify them at an early stage and ensure they "do no harm", despite the difficulties this poses in fragile settings.

PRIORITIES

- Increased opportunities for researchers to learn from one another, as well as from practitioners and policymakers, in the identification of best practices and lessons learned is helpful.
- Learning from various theories and models to increase research impact, including impact pathways, is of equally significant interest to researchers.

Organized by
- NWO-WOTRO
  - Facilitator: *Han van Dijk, Research Uptake Manager - NWO-WOTRO*

The "E" word: why counter-radicalization needs to use emotion

Key insights
The context and challenges of radicalization are well known, but how should we design interventions that counter it? How and why are people self-radicalizing and how do we persuade them to change their views and behavior? ISIS/Islamic State/DAESH is acknowledged as being effective at recruitment because of the strong emotional narratives it uses. What is our alternative?

Media, communication professionals, and journalist can become better at persuasive storytelling and apply their media skills to behavior change. Three elements are needed for powerful persuasion: credible sources; a logical approach; and emotional appeal.

Placing oneself in the position of someone finding ISIS potentially attractive and working out what emotions that person is feeling is an eye-opening tool to reflect on how to develop a

media intervention. The first challenge is to get enough insight into the target audience's beliefs – in this case, young men from Western European societies who join ISIS – and to work out what they actually think. This can be done by isolating some of the influencing factors, such as their peers or parents, for example, and attempting to identify the beliefs they may hold in relation to these influencers. Subsequently the emotional payoffs of ISIS messages can be worked out by subjecting oneself to one of its propaganda videos, quite the challenging exercise indeed.

PRIORITIES

- More research is needed into the types of narratives that Islamic State videos and other media are using – whether the Adventure story, drawing upon military power and 'heroes on white horses', which leads to emotions of "power" + "belonging" for potential recruits, or the Romance storylines, which use military accomplishments and parade with spoils of war to build an emotion of "superiority".
- More work is needed on the current Western counter-narratives that have been developed in response, many of which appear to be based on engendering the emotions of "guilt" + "shame" in those at risk within the target audiences.

Organized by
- RNW-RNTC
    - Facilitator: Brandon Oelofse, Senior Trainer & Coordinator – RNTC

Mapping for a purpose: How to achieve impact with campaigns & events

Key insights
Security and rule of law actors deal with complex questions, whereby a range of multi-layered strategic approaches to highly intricate issues may exist. However, a common thread for some of them is how to change views and behaviors? Many questions in this respect remain, particularly in relation to countering radicalization.

When using media for social change, understanding one's audience, mapping its influencers, agreed realities, and emotional pay-offs are key to design a highly precise programme or campaign that is persuasive. First, the target audience needs to be identified when planning behavior change media intervention. To make it precise, you look for a freely chosen behavior plus a community who shares the same belief – for example Western European women who avoid breastfeeding in public – and ask the question, why do they do that? Who influences their behavior? What in their agreed reality is about their behavior and the views of the influencers? What emotional pay-offs do they get from their behavior? The media intervention is subsequently designed to change that emotional pay-off.

PRIORITIES

- A behavior change media intervention is a complex process requiring in depth research to enable it to have the precise, intended effect. To avoid it remains a theoretical approach only, extensive research is indispensable to measure successes.
- More research and exchange with practitioners is needed to better understand the power that media can have in relation to overarching development targets and strategies, lest a key tool will remain under-utilized.

Organized by

- RNW-RNTC
  - Facilitator: Brandon Oelofse, Senior Trainer & Coordinator – RNTC

Crisis communication

Key insights

To make the move from theoretical crisis communication to practice, a number of case studies featuring fictional NGOs were drawn upon. This underscored the fact that crisis communication is a complex and dynamic process, which involves a wide range of stakeholders.

PRIORITIES

- Shaping messages helps shaping perceptions, which is crucial in communicating and effectively managing crises. Each audience therefore crucially requires a specific message and tone.

Organized by

- Clingendael Institute Training
  - Facilitator: Hans Wurzer, Senior Trainer & Coordinator - Clingendael Institute Training

Chapter 3
Fishbowl closure

Moderator: Rob Sijstermans, Training & Research Fellow - Clingendael Institute Training

The fishbowl session served as a closing plenary in which participants reflected on their experiences and insights of the day. Discussions centered around the open atmosphere at the Conference in which thoughts and opinions could be shared, and the provision of a platform for reflection on current practices, in particular the challenging of current framings of i.a. radicalization, countering violent extremism, or migration.

A few key items came to the fore. Researchers, activists, policy-makers – everyone lives in the same "global village". This interconnectedness means that every actor must try to understand to the greatest extent possible how other actors think and work. All stakeholders ought to actively work together to examine and question the assumptions that shape how and why choices are made, who sets the agenda and at whose expense. One's frame of reference

– working in government, an NGO, on the ground, etc. – can limit the ability to look outside one's field of expertise.

The discussion highlighted the need to be "ahead of the curve". Prevention, of genocide, terrorism, migration or whatever other challenge, is the only viable long-term strategy. Unfortunately, much work focuses on short-term objectives, combating symptoms, rather than causes. In order to be proactive, stakeholders should work with and learn from all actors – especially those they disagree with. The tendency to remain in the echo chamber is fatal to effective prevention efforts, because it rules out the possibility of learning from mistakes or through best practices. Cooperation between stakeholders that do not see eye-to-eye can help to fill the gaps left by "silo" projects.

Marginalization, as a cause and consequence of many of the bigger issues that were discussed at the Conference, including terrorism, violence, and migration, prominently arose in the closing conversation. Marginalization can be found in practice, in the effects of policy, or lack of economic opportunities, or direct persecution. Importantly, however, marginalization can also take place in the marketplace of ideas and dialogues such as at conferences, where it is crucial to incorporate differing points of view. Much as the aforementioned echo chamber effect, leaving marginalized groups out of the very dialogue that means to help them can harm the effectiveness of any project. It is important to further explore the causes and consequences of marginalization, and to attempt to counter it in both theory and practice.

Ultimately, the discussion emphasized the need for continued investment in knowledge systems and platforms. Without room for discussion between experts, practitioners, participants, victims, activists and others, there is no scope for problems to be laid bare and improvements to be made.