Upgrading Peacekeeping to Counter Transnational Conflict Drivers

Five Essential Actions

Policy Brief 1

Upgrading Peacekeeping to Counter Transnational Conflict Drivers

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Summary

Technological progress, liberalization and the end of the Cold War have significantly altered existing transnational conflict drivers, as well as created new ones. A veritable process of fusion has taken place in which modern-day possibilities have irrevocably meshed with age-old legacies and practices, with the result that many of today's conflicts cannot be sustainably resolved without taking account of transnational conflict drivers. Yet, the international community's peace-building toolkit is not well equipped to do so. It's most visible and high-profile instrument, UN peacekeeping operations, remains particularly hamstrung by its focus on domestic conflict drivers, host-state capacity-building and national boundaries. To discharge their mandates more effectively, such operations need to improve their transnational situational awareness through dedicated intelligence and strategy units, and expand their regional reach through the introduction of roving envoys. Such critical assets could enable missions to focus more effectively on insulating domestic political processes from corruptive transnational influences in their area of operations.

Introduction[1]

Conflicts have seldom been purely local in nature. Even Julius Caesar's *The conquest of Gaul* illustrates how the Romans cleverly manipulated local conflicts to ruthlessly expand their empire around 50BC. Yet, as the barriers of distance have evaporated with accelerating speed over the past decades, thanks to technological progress, liberalization and the end of the Cold War, conflicts have become increasingly enmeshed in old as well as new cross-border influences. In particular, *transnational* conflict drivers – i.e., actions primarily emanating from non-state actors – have gained prominence. The wars being fought in Syria and Iraq illustrate perfectly how transnational flows of recruits, money, ideology and technology influence the tide of battle – and have made local conflict resolution nearly impossible.

Over the same past few decades, the international community's diplomatic, economic and military efforts to manage and resolve conflicts have increased hugely, especially since the early 1990s.[2] United Nations peacekeeping is the most visible – and perhaps the most effective – manifestation of this endeavor. UN mission staff, for example, doubled from around 50,000 to 100,000 over the last decade alone; mission expenditure tripled from around US$2.7 billion to 7.8 billion and mission mandates expanded from ceasefire monitoring to multidimensional state-building efforts.[3] However, peacekeeping missions remain largely focused on domestic conflict drivers and are not well equipped to address transnational ones, despite their growing relevance.

This brief first discusses the present-day nature of transnational conflict drivers, then analyses some of the key issues that peacekeeping missions face as a consequence of such factors. It concludes by setting out five essential actions that could improve peacekeeping operations.

Transnational conflict drivers: fusing old and new

Conflicts are broadly understood as violent clashes between several armed groups, which each display a certain level of organization, and result in significant numbers of casualties. They are typically influenced by a combination of domestic, international and transnational drivers - figure 1 below provides a brief summary of critical ones. It is largely based on discussions during an expert event and online debate of the Hague-based Knowledge Platform Security &Rule of Law (the Platform hereafter).[4] Such conflict drivers need to be identified, understood and countered in order to address conflicts comprehensively and sustainably. While most of them have deep historic roots, some have acquired new characteristics over the past decades that have greatly amplified their reach and impact. A few are entirely new.

Figure 1: Key domestic, international and transnational conflict drivers



Figure 1 suggests that most change has occurred in the category of transnational conflict drivers, the focus of this policy brief.[5] Major recent policy documents have readily acknowledged their influence on conflict (and its recurrence) over the past decades.[6] For instance, the abovementioned Syrian civil war is so thoroughly embedded in the socio-religious texture of the Gulf and the Levant – with their clerics, charities, volunteers and individual sponsors of different hues – that it will be hard to resolve without addressing their roles first, or at least in parallel.[7] However, it is by no means unique: alternative examples of conflicts infused by such drivers abound and include Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali, Libya and the eastern DRC.

For the purpose of this policy brief, transnational conflict drivers refer to actions taken by non-state actors, such as individuals, diaspora networks, armed groups and businesses which, intentionally or unintentionally, initiate, influence or perpetuate a conflict that takes place in another country than their main area of presence. Non-state actors typically engage in such actions for reasons of socio-ethnic ties (e.g., in the case of diaspora groups), transnational beliefs and solidarity (e.g., Muslims in support of the 'umma') or profit (e.g., in the case of licit and illicit commercial enterprises). Transnational conflict drivers therefore cover a broad and amorphous area, including issues such as:

- International volunteers joining one side of a conflict. For example, those that served with the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) or Chechen volunteers fighting for the Islamic State today;
- Individuals and charities financing conflict parties. Funds from the Irish diaspora in the US for the IRA come to mind, as does Gulf-based financing of Syrian opposition groups;
- religious groups offering ideological inspiration and legitimacy, as, for instance, Al Qaeda does through its innovative 'franchise terrorism' for Boko Haram and Al-Shabab;
- Arms supplies that fuel conflict – a prime example are the commercial deliveries by Viktor Bout to various armed groups in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars;[8]
- Modern technology, when non-state actors use social media to influence multiple audiences in real time. The Islamic State utilises Twitter and YouTube as tools to recruit, deter and enforce obedience with appreciable effect;
- Opportunistic engagement with the push-and-pull factors of globalized crime. The aim thereof may simply be to generate profits to sustain a party in conflict (as in Afghanistan), but it could also be to capture the political space to settle a conflict (as in Guinea-Bissau);
- Licit transactions by multinationals in conflict zones when their engagement with states and/or non-state armed groups generates revenues large enough to influence conflict. The trade in minerals in the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo provides an example hereof.

Many of the actors behind this broad array of transnational conflict drivers fuse genuine beliefs with Machiavellian machinations, deceit with brazen openness, and licit with illicit activity. Several recent developments have enabled transnational actors to present themselves in such a Janus-type fashion – combining attraction with repulsion – and to engage more broadly across the globe.

To start with, technological advances in the areas of computerization, micro-electronics, containerization and commercial aviation have greatly reduced physical barriers to movement and communication. These developments have significantly lowered the costs of global engagement to the particular benefit of non-state actors.[9] Today, expensive and hard-to-organize state-like features such as globe-spanning diplomatic, military or intelligence networks are no longer required. Loosely organized networks can be maintained instead through the use of modern (often free) communication technology, financial offshore centres, commercial transport hubs and co-opted local infrastructure.

Moreover, the gradual establishment of a partial global market economy after World War II has considerably reduced legal and regulatory barriers to economic movement. The creation of a liberal trading regime for goods, a network of commercial aviation for individuals, and a tolerant approach to electronic traffic have played a key role.[10] Notwithstanding prevailing restrictions in many areas of global economic activity (for example, the trade in services) and communication (for example, China’s Great Firewall), a significant consequence has been that individuals and groups are more at liberty to engage globally than ever before, for better or for worse.

Finally, the end of the Cold War and its climate of debilitating fear of the existential threat of US-USSR confrontation enabled suppressed conflicts to re-acquire their own frame (for example, in Afghanistan and Yugoslavia). It also opened up the intellectual space to question the prevailing world order and ideology. This offered fertile ground for transnational actors to expand their roles – from the arms trade to religious ideology.

Taken together, these developments have altered the meaning of physical, regulatory and mental distance. Simply put, where the first provided transnational actors with many of the tools needed to increase operations and reach, the latter two enhanced their available economic and political operating space. As a result, modern-day possibilities have unstoppably and irrevocably meshed with age-old legacies and practices to enhance existing transnational conflict drivers and create new ones. A brief look at two transnational conflict drivers that represent the extreme ends of the moral spectrum – terrorism by religiously inspired armed groups as illicit and reprehensible activity, and the commodity trade by multinationals as licit and seemingly innocuous activity – will illustrate this intermeshing.

Box 1: Mapping international conflict drivers

International conflict drivers refer to actions that states take to intentionally initiate, influence or perpetuate a conflict that is principally conducted between two or more other parties and in which they do not formally engage themselves. Examples – each with a long historical track record – include:

- Diplomatic support for one of the fighting parties to strengthen its international standing and legitimacy. Consider German and Dutch support for the Boers in the Anglo-Boer wars of 1899-1902, or Russian support for President Assad's Syria anno 2014;
- Arms deliveries by a state that is not formally engaged have influenced conflict from the first Punic War to the Afghan conflict today;
- Foreign forces from 'non-involved' countries can exercise a profound influence. Recent examples include Russia's use of GRU Spetsnaz Forces in the Ukraine (special forces that are part of its military intelligence), or US drones in Yemen and Pakistan;
- state-sponsored ideology has stimulated overt and covert conflict across international boundaries from the Crusades to Europe's Thirty Years' War and the Cold War;
- States also frequently offer sanctuary to combatants from one of the parties to a conflict to rest, train and recuperate. Just as Libya long provided a safe haven to the IRA and PLO, so does Pakistan offer such support to different Taliban groups today.

States typically resort to such actions when they perceive that conflicts could affect their national interests significantly, though not existentially. While such actions are more insidious, cheaper and deniable, they are neither without risk nor free of unpredictable consequences. Just recently, Russian sponsorship of insurgents in eastern Ukraine unexpectedly boomeranged to reduce its prestige and influence when they tragically destroyed flight MH17.

A movement like Al Qaeda, which has inspired a form of 'franchise terrorism' across the Islamic world, combines both ancient and modern elements. It harks back to the language and symbolism of the heydays of the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates and taps into strong tribal notions of revenge and religious loyalty. But it combines this with a radical and new interpretation of the Islamic faith while using cutting-edge technology, modern finance and advanced business models to spread its message to maximum effect.[11] Propagating religious convictions by violent methods is as old as humanity, but it can now be done with global reach and in real time. This has multiple 'new' consequences. First, it enables groups to frame events in a partial or biased manner and ensure they go viral without opportunity for correction.[12] Second, it makes it possible to tap into a global community to raise funds, recruits and weapons with utter disregard for borders. Third, it inspires imitation disproportionate to the material and social power base of the projecting transnational actor.

Turning to business, the global trade in valuable commodities by multinational corporations is nothing new either. In fact, the Dutch East India Company monopolised the spice trade with the Far East through a complex network of transactions as far back as the 17th century. Yet, the increased volume and reach of today's shipping fleets have made the business truly global.[13] In addition, liberalization and the need to generate ever-more shareholder value have made it highly competitive. Finally, consumer preferences, state-led development and

industrial needs push businesses into a permanent search for new supplies that might require 'deals with the devil' as the resource frontier shifts to fragile and hard-to-access environments. While most corporations are unlikely to intentionally contribute to conflict, they can unwittingly or indirectly do so when they engage in commercial transactions with states and non-state groups in conflict zones. This is particularly likely in the trade in certain natural resources (such as oil), which are so profitable that their revenues influence the accountability of their recipients to their social support base.[14] An example is how the legitimate sale of Nigerian oil enables the continuation of highly exclusive policies and corruption at grand scale.[15] This, in turn, arguably enhances the appeal of Boko Haram's narrative, enables the Nigerian government's military-style response to the group, and creates broader ripple effects throughout the Sahel region.

In short, it is not just the illicit part of the global economy that features transnational conflict drivers: the veneer of consumer choice and legitimate trade tends to hide the fact that the licit part of the international economy also contains them in abundance. Since transnational conflict drivers are structurally intertwined with legal practices that have many beneficial effects, they are hard to eliminate. Although initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative have sought to contain their negative effects through governance and transparency improvements, these remain limited in scope.

Mitigating or eliminating transnational conflict drivers requires coordinated efforts by source, transit and destination countries. Such collective action is, however, hard to achieve as different countries have different incentives. A common result is therefore that transnational drivers are not eliminated, but their effects mitigated relatively effectively at the end of the chain of connectivity that is politically strongest and richest while the reverse applies to its opposite end. For example, the US has the funds and capability for 'homeland security' to minimise the risk of radicalized fighters returning to wreak havoc. Yet, this does not stop the Syrian and Iraqi populations from suffering from the brutality of US Muslim citizens who decide to join their civil wars. In similar vein, violence connected to the drug trade is reasonably well controlled in the West, where demand for drugs is strong, but spiralling out of control in the developing countries that produce and transit them.

Developments in peacekeeping: capabilities and mandates

An UN-mandated peacekeeping operation is a unique form of international assistance that temporarily transfers diplomatic attention and resources on to countries facing the prospect or legacy of a conflict they cannot manage by themselves. It is the closest available international approximation of the notion of collective security. Legitimized by the UN Security Council (UNSC), countries deploy foreign forces in a conflict situation under the UN's command on the basis of the principles of impartiality, consent and limited use of force. Peacekeeping operations initially fulfilled basic confidence-building functions by executing neutral activities such as cease-fire monitoring and separation of fighting parties. However, especially in the course of the 2000s, they gradually acquired a more interventionist posture,

characterized by the use of force to protect civilians and capacity to implement ambitious, multidimensional mandates.[16] Generally speaking, these mandates focused on safeguarding human rights, improving security and justice, and raising the quality of governance. They did not confer the authority or resources upon missions to examine, let alone address, the transnational relations in which present-day conflicts have become so inextricably intermeshed. Related to this development, peacekeeping operations have retained a strong focus on state borders and state sovereignty.[17] Since their taskmasters are states themselves, this should not come as a surprise.

As a consequence, peacekeeping operations remain largely focused on *domestic* conflict drivers and are not well tooled to address transnational ones. Despite this limitation, peacekeeping has nevertheless proven to be rather effective in reducing the chance of countries relapsing into conflict, probably in part by providing a mechanism that restores basic domestic confidence and prevents accidental conflict escalation.[18] Yet, the preceding review of transnational conflict drivers and the nature of present-day conflict suggest that at least three issues need to be addressed to ensure that peacekeeping remains effective:[19]

Many conflicts are transnational or international from early on, irrespective of later levels of cross-border support. Roughly a third of all conflicts in 2013 were internationalized intrastate conflicts.[20] To this must be added a range of non-state conflicts that have a transnational component such as in Syria-Iraq, the Great Lakes or Chad-Sudan-Central African Republic. In short, once there is a modicum of peace to work with, peacekeeping missions will often require an approach that goes beyond national boundaries. Yet regional peacekeeping missions with a coordinated presence in several neighbouring countries and with the aim of addressing different issues and manifestations of the same conflict are basically non-existent. Coherent and well-resourced regional initiatives also remain exceptions, although they could offer a ‘soft’ substitute for multiple-country peacekeeping. For example, one of the tasks of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) mission is to “support the development of a comprehensive regional and international coordination in the fight against terrorism and organized crime”. According to its ‘facts and figures’ sheet it will seek to accomplish this in cooperation with the European Union’s Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) and the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali). However, the Council decision establishing the Niger mission neither mentions this nor provides it with the necessary authority and resources.[21] Hence, even where innovation takes place, the doctrine, structure and mandate of missions remain largely reflective of their national orientation, ensuring a fragmented approach.

Many present-day conflicts feature significant numbers of externally supported armed groups. The Syrian civil war, with an estimated 5,000+ armed groups playing a role, is perhaps the most extreme example of such fragmentation.[22] Many other conflicts, such as those in the DRC and Afghanistan, also fit the picture. This diversity can to a significant extent be explained as a function of external – often transnational, sometimes international – support for different fighting groups. For example, in respect of Syria, individuals and charities in the Gulf basically have pursued a ‘fund your favourite opposition group’ logic through Kuwait’s relaxed financial regulatory system that helped create the myriad armed groups present

today. From a peacekeeping perspective, the trouble is twofold. First, missions generally have no mandate to address such transnational influences head-on (e.g., authority to cross borders or to initiate legal or law enforcement actions through established international channels) and little capacity to mitigate them in their operations area (e.g., through intelligence). Second, the standard 'tools' of political dialogue and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) that missions use to reduce and manage such fragmentation risk having little traction with armed groups that enjoy a significant measure of external support. They are at least partially beholden to the interests of their sponsors, with whom most missions typically cannot engage. In short, they are less likely to genuinely participate in such initiatives or to be sensitive to the type of political pressure a peacekeeping mission can bring to bear.

External financing facilitates the initiation, continuation and recurrence of conflict. It is common knowledge that many conflict parties receive external financing that, directly or indirectly, enables them to initiate, continue or restart conflict. With their strong focus on realising governance and security improvements, peacekeeping missions typically have little ability to map, track and deal with such financial flows by themselves, or through closer coordination with other international mechanisms. To improve this situation, it is necessary to note at least three different types of conflict financing. First, and most obvious, is criminal finance through, for example, the proceeds from the trade in drugs, other high-value commodities or humans between armed groups, criminal enterprises and sometimes multinationals. Second, transnational actors (e.g., diaspora) or other countries may finance one or several of the conflict parties, through either the regular or the informal banking system, or simply in cash. Finally, legal transactions between multinationals and states for the sale of natural resources or other commodities can finance conflict. This does not necessarily have to occur directly, as effects can be transmitted via exclusionary policies that lead to conflict (recurrence) only in the longer run. The point is not that peacekeeping missions lack the capacity to address such flows by themselves, but that they do not have the analytical wherewithal to understand how such flows influence the political and security incentives of the domestic elites who are their interlocutors. For example, missions deploy little expertise in the areas of customs, trade, investment and economic/financial analysis.

The disjuncture between the transnational aspects of a globalizing world, the nature of present-day conflict, and peacekeeping as an international tool to manage conflict within national boundaries is readily apparent from the above analysis. Many analysts have demanded that attention be paid to this issue on the basis of particular elements of this composite picture – e.g., organized crime.[23] However, effective remedial action must go beyond an issue-specific analysis and take a broader look at how peacekeeping doctrine, tools and operations can address transnational conflict drivers in a globalized world.

Five actions for 21st century peacekeeping

Peacekeeping missions create a temporary window of opportunity during which the guns are silent. This gives non-violent conflict resolution methods a chance to reconcile the different demands and interests of the parties – if they are willing to talk. Peacekeeping missions have gradually acquired the instruments to initiate many such non-violent initiatives, such as

political dialogue, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and capacity-building. In fact, some missions have gone as far as temporarily acting as substitutes for domestic administrations – for example, in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Timor-Leste (UNTAET). However, this is only feasible in small countries and is likely to remain the exception. Consequently, and due to the security-focused nature of the UN, larger missions will continue to prioritize governance and security with a focus on restoring the government capability of the host-state – despite all the risks this entails.[24] The challenge is to remain within this paradigm while shifting it slightly towards the logic and economy of 21st century conflict.[25] Five actions could help to accomplish this:

Short term

Action #1: Ensure every new peacekeeping mission has an adequate and dedicated intelligence capability that focuses on building a detailed understanding of transnational, international and domestic conflict drivers so that it's diplomatic and military operations are on firmer analytical ground. It is encouraging that the UN's mission to Mali (MINUSMA) has a sizeable intelligence component,[26] but the pitfalls of intelligence encountered in Afghanistan[27] must be avoided, and its remit must extend beyond Mali's frontiers to make a difference.

Action #2: Ensure every new mission has a dedicated strategy unit that can absorb intelligence, nurture relations with 'unusual voices' (such as religious and informal leaders, including in cross-border areas), engage in regional analysis and vet all advice to the Special Representative on how to proceed in political negotiations and dialogue. Such units should be staffed by professional political affairs officers, linguists and anthropologists. They would serve the dual purpose of having dedicated capacity to connect an understanding of the regional situation with the domestic focus of the mission, and feed into the political process of dialogue with national authorities and other stakeholders.

Action #3: Focus mission capabilities on insulating domestic politics from transnational influences. Leveraging the information generated by critical assets such as intelligence and strategy units will improve the ability of missions to deal with political elites who are complicit in various destabilising activities such as organized crime or armed violence. The focus should be on insulating political processes and public authority from corrupting transnational influences. For example, addressing transnational criminal activity with corrosive and corrupting effects on politics deserves priority over reducing criminal activities that simply generate a profit.

Medium term

Action #4: Provide every mission with at least one regional envoy. Implementing actions 1 and 2 would provide missions with a much better awareness of regional and transnational situations. However, key findings will often need to be actioned in neighbouring countries through diplomatic channels. While the Special Representative's engagement with in-country UN Member State ambassadors or with colleagues at other UN missions may serve this purpose, it is unlikely to build the relations or generate the sustained push that will often be required. Hence, missions should be endowed with one or two high-level roving diplomats in

the form of regional envoys who report to the Special Representative, supported by small teams closely linked to the mission's strategy unit.

Long term

Action #5: Explore options for establishing regional mandates. Eventually, there needs to be a conversation between UNSC members, key Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to explore whether, and if so under what conditions, a multi-country peacekeeping concept could be developed. A mission such as MINUSMA would, for example, greatly benefit from having subsidiary offices in Niger, Mauretania and Algeria as well as limited forces on key border points and along key transit routes. This would naturally raise a host of diplomatic, security and accountability questions, for which standardized options need to be developed if rapid deployment is to be assured. Yet an operational presence in the region that emanates from the mission's main country of deployment would, arguably, enhance its ability to address conflict in a more sustainable fashion.

To close, peacekeeping missions will not and should not become the solution to all conflict drivers that are transnational in nature. They are likely to retain much of their current focus on domestic conflict drivers. Nevertheless, it is important that they take better account of transnational conflict drivers and that they have a fit-for-purpose toolkit at their disposal to do so more effectively.

Notes

[1] This policy brief benefited from an expert event on 1 July 2014 where transnational conflict drivers were discussed in relation to the possibilities for conflict resolution in Afghanistan and Mali (link here). Particular thanks go to Thomas Barfield (Boston University), Peter Tinti (journalist), Emile Simpson (author of *War from the Ground up*), Annemaaike Tempelaar (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Christopher O'Donnell (UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations) for their views and inputs during the event. The contents of this policy brief are the responsibility of the author.

[2] For example: Human Security Report Project (2010), *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

[3] Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet_archive.shtml (consulted 20 August 2014).

[4] See: http://www.kpsrl.org/online-debate. The debate took place in July/August 2014.

[5] International conflict drivers are briefly dealt with in Box 1 below. Domestic conflict drivers have been dealt with extensively elsewhere.

[6] World Bank (2011), *Conflict, Security and Development*, World Development Report, Washington DC; OECD (2011), *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

[7] For an in-depth analysis: Van Veen, E. and I. Abdo (2014), *Between Fragmentation and Brutality: Options for Addressing the Syrian Civil War*, Clingendael Conflict Research Unit Report, The Hague.

[8] Feinstein, A. (2011), *The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade*, Hamish Hamilton, London.

[9] For example, the cost of a three-minute transatlantic phone call dropped from US$250 in 1930 to a few cents in 2005 (Cairncross, in: Wolf, M. (2005), *Why Globalization Works*, Yale Note Bene, New Haven.

[10] For a powerful illustrative visual: Jacquemard, B. (2014), *6 Maps that Explain Global Supply Chains*, Blogpost, Vox.com via The Network Effect (consulted 18 September 2014); see also: Wolf, M. (2005), op.cit.

[11] See for example: Ahmed, A. (2013), *The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam*, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC.

[12] An example is how the – probably accidental – burning of a number of copies of the Quran on Bagram airbase (Afghanistan) could be framed by the Taliban as an act of US oppression and disrespect for the Islamic faith, and used to trigger a reaction of utter indignation, even violence, throughout the Muslim world. Another example is the professional and cynical gaming of Twitter by the Islamic State. By circulating unverified footage of the execution of captured Iraqi soldiers via organizraed hash tag campaigns, it reinforces the adversarial Sunni-Shia frame on which it thrives (The Atlantic, 16 June 2014 (consulted 2 September 2014).

[13] For example, between 1950 and 2011 international trade grew about twice as fast as general economic activity, inter alia resulting in the trebling of world trade to 45% of global GDP over this period. Today, around 70% of global trade takes place by ship in a highly competitive market. Crude oil alone accounts for about 25% of the goods shipped. Source: http://worldoceanreview.com/en/wor-1/transport/global-shipping/1/ (consulted 27 August 2014).

[14] See for example: Moore, M., A. Schmidt and S. Unsworth (2009), *Assuring Our Common Future in a Globalised World: The Global Context of Conflict and State Fragility*, Working paper, UK Department for International Development, London.

[15] For the illicit dimension of Nigerian oil sales: Katsouris, C. and A. Sayne (2013), *Nigeria's Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen Oil*, Chatham House, London.

[16] For example: What's in Blue, 10 June 2014; Aquierre, M. (2009), Pressing Issues for UN Peacekeeping Operations, Global Policy Forum (both consulted 27 August 2014). This development arguably reflects the realization, based on the UN's experiences in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, that kinetic force can be vital to stop gross violations of the principles on which the UN is founded. It also reflects the understanding that preventing the recurrence of civil wars, non-state wars and their hybrids – more typical for the period 1991-2014 – requires a different intervention logic and toolkit than the interstate wars that peacekeeping originally sought to contain.

[17] The mandate of the 'Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali' (MINUSMA) offers a good example of both issues: UN/S/RES/2100 (2013) (consulted 10 September 2014).

[18] See: Paris, R. (2014), *Peacekeeping Works Better Than You May Think*, Political Violence @ A Glance (consulted 28 August 2014) for a brief introduction and further references; Fortna, V. (2008), *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerent's Choices after Civil War*, Princeton University Press (PUP), Princeton; Doyle, M. and N. Sambanis (2006), *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, PUP, Princeton.

[19] For a deeper analysis of some of the (transnational) conflict trends referenced here: Briscoe, I. (2014), *Conflict, security and emerging threats*, Chapter for the Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2014, The Hague.

[20] Source: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/ (consulted 1 September 2014).

[21] EU Council Decision (16 July 2012), *European Union CSDP mission in Niger* (EUCAP Sahel Niger), 2102/392/CFSP, (consulted 01/09/14).

[22] The Carter Center (2014), *Syria Countrywide Conflict Report*, Issue 3, Atlanta.

[23] See for example: Kemp, W., M. Shaw and A. Boutellis (2013), *The Elephant in the Room: How Can Peace Operations Deal with Organized Crime?*, International Peace Institute (IPI), New York.

[24] The fate of UNMISS in South Sudan provides a good recent example of a type of 'Stockholm syndrome' that can result. See: Hutton, L. (2014), *Prolonging the agony of UNMISS: The Implementation Challenges of a New Mandate During a Civil War*, Clingendael Conflict Research Unit Policy Brief, The Hague.

[25] The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) initiated some reflection on this question through its 2009 'New Horizon Initiative' but has largely focused on the capability challenges that arise from the current level of peacekeeping 'overstretch'.

[26] Boeke, S. (2014), 'Nederlandse oren en ogen in Mali', in: *Atlantisch Perspectief,* No. 1, The Hague [Dutch eyes and ears in Mali].

[27] As illustrated by the following statement: 'Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the US intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy' (Flynn, M., M. Pottinger and P. Batchelor (2010), *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, Center for New American Security). In part, this was the case because massive intelligence resources were devoted to preventing and dealing with Improved Explosive Devices to protect International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel instead of understanding the conflict.

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