



# The Effects of Global and Cross-Border Factors on National and Local Conflict and Transitional Dynamics

Trends, challenges and knowledge gaps



# The Effects of Global and Cross-Border Factors on National and Local Conflict and Transitional Dynamics

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## Introduction

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This background report seeks to inform preparation of a strategic research agenda to better understand how global and transnational security developments are influencing local conflict in fragile states.

*Fragile states* refers to conflict-affected and post conflict countries and those with inadequate institutional capacity to reduce poverty effectively without external assistance.<sup>1</sup> An effective research agenda needs to include identifying and understanding the associated links with socioeconomic drivers of conflict and private sector activities, trade, and finance. It must also support the Netherlands' aid, trade, and investment agenda.

An earlier KPSRL background report by Evelien Weller and titled a “comprehensive approach to human security in fragile states” discusses the emergence of the paradigm of human security as the appropriate reference point for security. The report finds that the notion of human security has developed with the emergence of a wide range of new security threats at local, national, and global levels, and—though criticized—has become a defined and flexible tool for analyzing the root causes of threats and responding to complex and multidimensional threats.<sup>2</sup>

Recognition is now widespread that peace, security, justice, and sustainable development are inherently linked, and that promoting them therefore requires a comprehensive approach.<sup>3</sup> Weller's report identifies key challenges and knowledge gaps in relation to a comprehensive approach to human security, distilling three cross-cutting issues: (1) shared and context-specific understanding and the inclusion of relevant local stakeholders, (2) assumptions and theories informing interventions and the potential for a comprehensive approach based on a shared vision, and (3) the nature of evolving transnational security trends and related implications for policy and practice in fragile states.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Government of the Netherlands “A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment,” April 2013, <http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/letters/2013/04/05/global-dividends-a-new-agenda-for-aid-trade-and-investment.html>, 26.

<sup>2</sup> Evelien Weller, “Knowledge Platform Security and Rule of Law: Working Group Comprehensive Approach to Human Security: Research Report: Comprehensive Approach to Human Security: Trends, Challenges and Knowledge Gaps,” September 29, 2014, <http://www.kpsrl.org/browse/download/t/comprehensive-approach-to-human-security-research-report>, 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

In relation to evolving trends, international and local responses in fragile states have tended to focus on local or national security challenges. How global and transnational or cross-border security developments shape conflict at the local level and what this means for policy are important to understand.<sup>5</sup> Weller's report goes on to refer to evolving security threats that arise in a more interconnected world.<sup>6</sup>

This report seeks to inform the preparation of a strategic research agenda on the third identified knowledge gap, that is, on how global and transnational security developments are influencing conflict at the local level in fragile states, and what the associated implications are for the Netherlands' aid and trade agenda.

Global and transnational factors or developments are broadly defined. A recent KPSRL debate on local conflicts in transnational entanglements, for example, recognized that Western ideas of neoliberal deregulation and privatization influence international interventions in peacebuilding just as cross-border rebels, insurgent groups, and organized crime do.<sup>7</sup>

A research agenda requires a narrower focus than this, however. Other factors notwithstanding, transnational organized crime is increasingly recognized as a key threat to stability and development.<sup>8</sup> The World Bank Development Report 2011, titled "Conflict, Security, and Development," in fact focused on international organized crime.<sup>9</sup>

An OECD working paper by Paula Miraglia and her colleagues argues that transnational organized crime is a development issue because "it can undermine governance systems, increase levels of violence and insecurity and trap communities in cycles of poverty."<sup>10</sup> Walter Kemp and his colleagues argue that transnational organized crime is the "elephant in the room" in peacebuilding and a threat in almost every area where the United Nations has peace operations, including those fragile states with which the Netherlands has an aid relationship.<sup>11</sup> Its impact in African context is also documented in case studies.<sup>12</sup> It has further been argued that transnational organized crime is an intrinsic element of the

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<sup>5</sup> Weller, "Human Security," 17.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 23.

<sup>7</sup> Karlijn Muiderman, "Closing of the online debate on local conflicts in transnational entanglements," September 19, 2014, <http://www.kpsrl.org/browse/browse-item/t/closing-of-the-online-debate-on-local-conflicts-in-transnational-entanglements>.

<sup>8</sup> See Tuesday Reitano, Marcena Hunter, Adam Rodrigues, and Mark Shaw, "Organized Crime: A Cross-Cutting Threat to Sustainable Development," Research Report, The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, January 2015, <http://www.globalinitiative.net>, 3.

<sup>9</sup> World Bank, "World Development Report 2011," [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011\\_Full\\_Text.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf), 2-4; see also Reitano et al., "Organized Crime," 3.

<sup>10</sup> Paula Miraglia, Rolando Ochoa, and Ivan Briscoe, "Transnational organised crime and fragile states," OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers, OECD, October 2012, [http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/transnational-organised-crime-and-fragile-states\\_5k49dfg88s40-en](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/transnational-organised-crime-and-fragile-states_5k49dfg88s40-en), 3.

<sup>11</sup> Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw, and Adam Boutellis, "The Elephant in the Room: How Can Peace Operations Deal with Organized Crime?" International Peace Institute, 2013, [http://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/ipi\\_e-pub-elephant\\_in\\_the\\_room.pdf](http://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/ipi_e-pub-elephant_in_the_room.pdf).

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

development challenge and must be interwoven throughout broader development response frameworks.<sup>13</sup>

We therefore propose that global and transnational factors and developments for this research be narrowed to transnational organized crime, and take into account the associated links with socioeconomic drivers of conflict, private sector activities, trade, and finance. Geographical focus should be narrow. Because many of the fragile and developing countries with which the Netherlands has an aid or aid-trade relationship are in Africa, and because less is known about strategic considerations in relation to transnational organized crime in Africa than in many other contexts, we recommend that the research focus on the African context.

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<sup>13</sup> See Reitano et al., "Organized Crime," 4.



## Transnational organized crime, development and stability

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### **Complex relationship with poverty**

The relationship between transnational organized crime and poverty is complex and multifaceted.<sup>14</sup> In particular, it is not simply that more poverty equals more organized crime, or that less poverty does. In Africa, for example, the growth in transnational organized crime has occurred at the same time as economic growth, reductions in conflict, and increased stability.<sup>15</sup> As states have transitioned toward a more sustainable state-building path, they have been vulnerable to infiltration by organized criminal groups.<sup>16</sup> During this period, states have paid too little attention to the rise of criminal actors, their long-term impact on governance, and the impact on the rule of law and development. Consequently, for fragile or conflict-affected states, initial increases in stability and economic growth and stronger infrastructure facilitate the growth of transnational crime networks.<sup>17</sup> Ivan Briscoe identifies certain factors that increase vulnerability: proximity to trafficking routes and destination markets, favorable international security conditions, extreme institutional fragmentation, high levels of inequality, and social atomization.<sup>18</sup> This growth in criminal networks in turn has a long-term impact on further economic growth and on stability and poverty.

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<sup>14</sup> See, among others, Tim Midgley, Ivan Briscoe, and Daniel Bertoli, "Identifying approaches and measuring impacts of programmes focused on Transnational Organised Crime," Department for International Development (DfID), UKaid, May 2014, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/812-identifying-approaches-and-measuring-impacts-of-programmes-focused-on-transnational-organised-crime>, 3.

<sup>15</sup> Mark Shaw and Tim Reitano, "The evolution of organised crime in Africa: Towards a new response," Institute for Security Studies Paper, April 2013, [www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper244.pdf](http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper244.pdf), 2.

<sup>16</sup> Midgley, Briscoe, and Bertoli, "Identifying approaches," 3.

<sup>17</sup> Shaw and Reitano, "Evolution of organised crime," 2.

<sup>18</sup> Ivan Briscoe, "What makes countries vulnerable to transnational organised crime?" Norwegian Peacebuilding Research Centre, September 2011, [http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6390~v~What\\_Makes\\_Countries\\_Vulnerable\\_to\\_Transnational\\_Organised\\_Crime\\_.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6390~v~What_Makes_Countries_Vulnerable_to_Transnational_Organised_Crime_.pdf).

### **Complex relationship with conflict**

A strong evidence base and broad consensus underscore that conflict and insecurity are major barriers to development.<sup>19</sup> The specific relationships among transnational organized crime, conflict, and stability are less well studied, however. With regard to conflict arising from transnational organized crime, some evidence indicates that it is often the result of competition between competing groups, or of law enforcement attempts to control transnational organized crime. Tim Midgley, Ivan Briscoe, and Adam Bertoli note that “criminalized territories and political systems in various regions, including Central America and the Andes, Central Asia and West Africa, have given rise to extreme levels of armed violence, destabilized states, and fuelled the armed activities of insurgent and radical groups.”<sup>20</sup> They also point out that evidence from a number of cases suggests that organized crime can do significant harm to civilian populations.<sup>21</sup>

The African experience alluded to - periods of increasing stability associated with increases in transnational organized crime - suggests a more complex relationship. On the one hand, the crime may result in conflict. On the other, increases in stability may enhance vulnerability to organized crime, which ultimately undermines stability.<sup>22</sup> A variety of factors may explain the vulnerability, including rising inequality.

### **Links between inequality, conflict, and corruption**

It is relatively well established that the presence of large horizontal inequalities, or inequalities among salient identity groups, increases the risk of violent conflict.<sup>23</sup> The relationship between inequality and corruption that operates in both directions is also established - inequality encourages corruption and corruption encourages inequality.<sup>24</sup> Jong Sung You and his colleagues argue that income inequality increases corruption. The wealthy have both greater motivation and opportunity to engage in corruption, and the poor are vulnerable to extortion and less able to monitor and hold the rich and powerful accountable as inequality increases. Inequality also adversely affects social norms related to corruption and people’s beliefs about the legitimacy of rules and institutions, making it easier for them to tolerate corruption as acceptable behavior.<sup>25</sup> Organized crime, particularly in Africa, is frequently associated with state corruption. In the long term, the connected elite become

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<sup>19</sup> See Edward Rees, Gordon Peake, Federico Davila, and Richard Hughes, “The Links Between Security Sector Reform and Development,” Civil-Military Occasional Papers, Australian Government, September 2014, <http://apo.org.au/research/links-between-security-sector-reform-and-development>.

<sup>20</sup> Midgley, Briscoe, and Bertoli, “Identifying approaches,” 3.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>22</sup> See *ibid.*, 3; Shaw and Reitano, “Evolution of organised crime,” 2.

<sup>23</sup> See Frances Stewart, “Horizontal inequalities as a cause of conflict,” World Development Report Background Paper, 2011, [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/6406082-1283882418764/WDR\\_Background\\_Paper\\_Stewart.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/6406082-1283882418764/WDR_Background_Paper_Stewart.pdf).

<sup>24</sup> Jong-Song You and Sanjeev Khagram, “A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption,” *American Sociological Review* 70 (February 2005): 136–57, <http://asr.sagepub.com/content/70/3/539.full.pdf>, 136–57.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

richer, which exacerbates inequalities, and misdirection of funds exacerbates poverty.<sup>26</sup> Continued growth in transnational organized crime may thus precipitate further conflict.

### **Difficulties of definition**

One of the continuing challenges in this field is the lack of consensus on a definition of organized crime. A failure to agree compromises both measurement and any claims to the beneficial effects of policies and practices.<sup>27</sup> A particularly useful definition sees corruption of state officials as a means rather than a goal: “a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are often in great public demand. Its continued existence is based on the use of force, threats, monopoly control and/or the corruption of public officials.”<sup>28</sup>

To be classed as transnational, “the dealings of organized crime must happen through at least two countries.”<sup>29</sup> Equally, one might instead require that it affects at least two countries. Four models are delineated: local organizations primarily concerned with local crime, local organizations with global reach, transnational logistical networks, and fragile states as transit points for transnational organized crime.<sup>30</sup>

Some researchers have argued that much organized crime is far more of a local phenomenon than is usually acknowledged, and that it does not constitute the international threat some security analysts claim.<sup>31</sup> At the same time, it is possible that the types of organized crime (both transnational and otherwise) now arising in fragile and developing contexts may not fall easily into any of these four categories. For example, a group may be based in one country but carry out their operations in another, such as Mozambican stock-theft syndicates operating in Swaziland.<sup>32</sup>

Difficulties of definition feed into difficulties of measurement.

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<sup>26</sup> See Etannibi Alemika, ed., “The impact of organised crime on governance in West Africa,” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, August 2013, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10199.pdf>; Peter Gastrow, “Termites at work: A report on transnational organised crime and state erosion in Kenya,” International Peace Institute, February 2012, <http://www.ipinst.org/2012/02/termites-at-work-transnational-organized-crime-and-state-erosion-in-kenya-comprehensive-research-findings>.

<sup>27</sup> Government of Canada, Department of Justice, “Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies: A Review of the Literature,” January 7, 2015, [http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/tr05\\_5/p3.html](http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/tr05_5/p3.html).

<sup>28</sup> Jay S. Albanese, *Organized Crime in Our Times*, 6th ed. (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing, 2010); Miraglia, Ochoa, and Briscoe, “Transnational organised crime.”

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>31</sup> Leslie Holmes, “Organised Crime and Corruption,” January 2011, <http://corruptionresearchnetwork.org/resources/frontpage-articles/organised-crime-and-corruption>.

<sup>32</sup> Annette Hübschle, ed., “Organised crime in Southern Africa: First annual review” Institute for Security Studies, December 2010, <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/OrgCrimeReviewDec2010.pdf>.

### Difficulties of measurement

Measurement is important both for designing interventions and in understanding the impact of interventions. A development intervention that, for example, seeks to redirect income-earning activities to legitimate activities needs to know the scale of the redirection required. Partly because there is no common definition, there is no globally agreed metric to measure the scale or impact of transnational organized crime. Nor are the various methods used in fragile states satisfactory. Methods based on seizures of drugs and other contraband, for example, or on arrests or other law enforcement metrics, do not work in contexts with little or no law enforcement, which is often the situation in fragile states. That there are no drug seizures in fragile states is more suggestive of the failure of law enforcement than of the absence of organized crime. Methods based on risk assessments have been proposed in some regions where the quality of the data permits.<sup>33</sup> Other methods include survey approaches. Further methods seek not to measure organized crime itself, but instead its associated violence, in terms of violent deaths or injuries, which are frequently and paradoxically at their highest when transnational organized crime groups are under threat. Others prefer not to attempt measurement and instead follow case-study qualitative approaches.

New measurement methods using novel approaches and new technology have emerged, however. Estimates have been made of total illicit financial flows using World Bank data and economic models.<sup>34</sup> The income Somali pirates enjoy through piracy has been measured using satellite imagery.<sup>35</sup> In an increasingly data-rich world, these examples raise the question of possible other innovative methods of measurement that might be developed for particular contexts, even in fragile states. Examples include combining satellite imagery analysis with survey-fieldwork and financial flow data, mobile phone or Internet use data, state capture, and any number of others.

The possibility of new methods arising from new tools highlights the question of what is to be measured. This requires a clear understanding of what impacts of transnational organized crime are to be measured as well as the theory of change relating to that impact.

### Inadequate theories of change and intervention approaches

A recent report for the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID) identifies and tests six interrelated and overlapping theories of change the authors believe guide the majority of programs focused on transnational organized crime.<sup>36</sup> For the majority of programs, these theories were not explicitly articulated but instead identified through discussions with practitioners.

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<sup>33</sup> See Tom Van Der Beken, "Risky Business: A Risk-Based Methodology to Measure Organized Crime," *Crime, Law and Social Change* 41, no. 5 (2004): 471–516.

<sup>34</sup> Kar and D Cartwright-Smith, "Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development," Global Financial Integrity (GFI), [http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/gfi\\_africareport\\_web.pdf](http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/gfi_africareport_web.pdf).

<sup>35</sup> Shortland, "Treasure Mapped: Using Satellite Imagery to Track the Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy," Chatham House AFP PP no. 2012/01, [http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0112pp\\_shortland.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0112pp_shortland.pdf).

<sup>36</sup> Midgley, Briscoe, and Bertoli, "Identifying approaches."

- Deterrence encapsulates law-enforcement and security sector reform, including improvements in rule of law institutions. The logic underpinning deterrence emerges from classical theory, in which crime is considered a rational choice influenced by costs and benefits: as the costs of crime increase, crime will be deterred.
- Severing the links between politics, the state, and crime covers transparency and community empowerment, anticorruption, and oversight mechanisms. Its logic sees increased accountability and transparency in how political and official decisions are taken reducing the level of interaction between transnational organized crime networks.
- Managed adaptation of crime to minimize negative impacts on violence, security and conflict covers harm reduction, decriminalization of contraband, and negotiated settlements. These approaches do not seek to directly prevent crime but instead to push the nature of criminal enterprise away from harmful impacts, particularly violent ones.
- Cultural change covers civic engagement and community cultural change. The logic here is that if trust between security providers and local people is improved and benefits of rule of law are tangible, then communities will reduce their support of crime.
- Economic transformation covers economic growth and access. Its logic is that people engage with transnational organized crime because they have no alternative livelihood opportunities.
- Global regulation covers global standards and compliance as well as constructive engagement with global bodies. Its goal is to improve harmonization, cooperation, and coordination between states and global transparency standards, which will in turn limit the ability of transnational organized crime networks to operate across international borders.

The DfID report finds some or all of the assumptions underlying these theories questionable, bringing into question interventions based on them. It also notes contradictions between theories: many of the deterrence approaches directly contradict aspects of managed adaptation approaches, and some of the global regulation policies inhibit the capacity to adopt alternative strategies. The report calls for a common set of indicators, a common understanding of transnational organized crime across institutions, and clearly articulated common goals, objectives, and approach.<sup>37</sup>

The various theories each assumed that interventions were primarily to reduce direct and short-term violence, and that it is predominantly the violence of transnational organized crime that undermines governance and fosters instability and that must be addressed. Yet as we have seen, organized crime may be associated with periods of increased stability and increased growth, especially in countries emerging from conflict. It may also bring short-term material wealth to some communities. Last, some evidence suggests that direct violence occurs primarily when there is competition for markets, or when direct law enforcement approaches are adopted.

Participants at a recent conference largely concurred that regardless of how the problem (of transnational organized crime) is defined, or the scope of activities included, the tools

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 41.

available to address organized crime are inadequate, and this is nowhere more evident than in Africa.<sup>38</sup>

Furthermore, though the main goal of organized crime is usually profit, in Africa, penetration of the state and key institutions and the consequent power obtained appears almost as important.<sup>39</sup> Theories of change thus need to be reformulated, particularly in the African context.

### **Rapid technological change underexplored in developing states**

Advances in technology and communications and the global political economy have brought about significant changes in how, regardless of where, transnational organized crime operates. It is a fluid and diversified industry that engages in a host of activities that include drug and human trafficking, piracy and counterfeiting, arms smuggling, and—increasingly—cybercrime. The communications innovations that permit cybercrime also permit an entirely new mode of operating in traditional illicit markets as states become increasingly connected in the electronic realm.<sup>40</sup>

Although strong states may also be affected, conflict-affected or otherwise weakened states are especially vulnerable and may serve as bases for international criminal enterprises. Such enterprises affect not only the host nation but also the region, as well as target or “market” countries.<sup>41</sup> The phenomenon of crime groups being located in one country adjacent to a more developed target country has been observed.<sup>42</sup>

In many developing regions, mobile phone and Internet technologies have overtaken traditional methods of communication, business, and banking. This in turn has seen an increase in cybercrime, which is frequently targeted across national borders. It has been argued that cybercriminals and their potential victims in the developing world face different economic and institutional factors.<sup>43</sup>

African networks currently do not attract the same level of attention from cybercriminals as other regions because of the current low level of connectivity of the region and low broadband penetration. Increases in connectivity lead to increases in cybercrime, as evident after the 2009 connection of the East Africa fiber-optic cable.<sup>44</sup> As fragile states become more connected, the rise in such crime could have serious implications for aid and trade, particularly given the few laws in developing states dealing with these crimes, a lack of

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<sup>38</sup> The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, “Conference Report: Unholy Alliances: Organised Crime in Southern Africa,” June 2014, <http://www.globalinitiative.net>.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Miraglia, Ochoa, and Briscoe, “Transnational organised crime,” 4.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Shaw and Reitano, “Evolution of organised crime,” 2.

<sup>43</sup> Nir Kshetri, “Diffusion and Effects of Cybercrime in Developing Economies,” *Third World Quarterly* 31, no. 7 (2010): 1057–79, [http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/N\\_Kshetri\\_Diffusion\\_2010.pdf](http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/N_Kshetri_Diffusion_2010.pdf).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

capacity to enforce existing laws, and a lack of measures to prevent such crimes. International cooperation is frequently required for effective enforcement.

### **Underexplored moral economies and links with extremism**

A recent *Global Policy* report by Axel Klein argues that because it is based on an underlying grievance Somali piracy deviates from the usual definition. The report explores the concept of moral economy to explain how both along the coast and within the diaspora the identity of Somalis as victims is used to legitimize pirate activities.<sup>45</sup>

This raises the question of the extent to which moral economies underpin various other manifestations of transnational organized crime on the continent, and in turn how these are related to extremism across Africa. Thorough reviews of the links between extremism and organized crime are available for developed contexts.<sup>46</sup> Work identifying moral economies is less developed in Africa, however, but by no means absent. Another recent study, for example, postulated links between historical disputes, Fulani herdsmen, and arms smuggling to Boko Haram.<sup>47</sup>

Nevertheless, a better understanding of the moral economies of transnational organized crime in fragile states, and their links with extremism, could suggest novel interventions and explain the failures of past interventions, in that their theories of change failed to address the moral economies involved.

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<sup>45</sup> Axel Klein, "The Moral Economy of Somali Piracy – Organised Criminal Business or Subsistence Activity?" *Global Policy* 4, no. 1 (February 2013): 94–100.

<sup>46</sup> See European Parliament, "Europe's Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union," Brussels, 2012, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201211/20121127ATT56707/20121127ATT56707EN.pdf>.

<sup>47</sup> Bolaji Omitol, "Between Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen: Organised Crime and Insecurity in Nigeria" (paper presented at the 5th Institute of Security Studies Conference on Crime and Crime Reduction, Sandton, South Africa, August 2014).



## Proposed Agenda

The following interrelated topics are recommended for further research:

- Teasing out the various impacts of transnational organized crime in specific contexts, theorizing an appropriate theory of change for these situations, and devising methods of measurement for the success or failure of possible interventions. The feasibility of a common set of indicators for transnational organized crime common to all contexts must be considered.
- Understanding the possible moral economies, including links with extremism, particularly in Africa, including in those countries with which the Netherlands has an aid or aid-trade relationship, and using the insights gained in developing interventions.
- Understanding the evolving use of new communications technologies in transnational cybercrime to better understand their potential in fragile states, and their impact on stability, not only in the African region, but also in other target countries with whom the Netherlands has an aid or aid-trade relationship.



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