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Peacebuilding in Mali: Linking Justice, Security, and Reconciliation

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Marco Lankhorst

Senior Researcher



The Hague Institute
for Global Justice

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Executive Summary

Rebuilding the Malian justice system is indispensable if peace, stability, and development are to be ensured. This second Hague Institute Policy Brief on the current situation in Mali aims to provide guidance to those in government and in the international community responsible for developing the policies and programs to rebuild the justice system. It does so on the basis of a scan, carried out in Mali during October 2013, of the most pressing problems that the population in central and northern Mali faces in terms of justice and human security. The scan consisted primarily of a series of more than seventy-five interviews with local leaders from central and northern Mali and is therefore substantially informed by views from below. The brief argues that the absence of a functioning justice system contributed to the crisis of 2012 and early 2013 and that the problems to be addressed therefore go beyond the need to render justice in the case of crimes committed during the crisis. It concludes by issuing seven concrete recommendations for policy.

First, to end impunity, the justice and security sectors must be merged. Second, given the level of corruption in law enforcement and the difficulties of addressing the problem, measures to prevent insecurity, crime, and violence should be prioritized. Third, a promising way to engage in prevention would be to experiment with community policing. Fourth, institutions involved in law enforcement must be given incentives to become considerably more responsive to the needs of the population in terms of security. Fifth, communicating the results of the work of law enforcement to concerned parties and the public is essential. Sixth, a better understanding of corruption in the justice system is critical. Last, intercommunity conflict needs to be addressed at a societal level through the media.

Author

Marco Lankhorst Senior researcher at The Hague Institute for Global Justice. The research reported on here was conducted, in considerable part, in the context of an assignment by VNG-International. All views are those of the author and do not represent the views of The Hague Institute for Global Justice or VNG-International. The author would like to thank Juan Garrigues-Tena, Karin Nijenhuis, Ivan Briscoe, Muriel Veldman, and Mark Bailey for their useful comments on a first draft. All remaining errors are the author's.

Introduction

In 2012 the Malian state came close to total collapse. Within a very short time, criminal and terrorist activity escalated, armed groups in the northern half of the country declared independence, lower-ranking factions of the army overthrew the government, and mixed forces of rebels and jihadists advanced on the capital. After French military forces intervened to restore order, the newly elected national government and its international partners began laying the foundations for the country's reconstruction, and tentative peace negotiations with various groups from the north were launched.

Both the government and its international partners believe strongly that rebuilding the Malian justice system so that it can effectively and fairly deal with crime and violence, including that committed during the crisis, is indispensable if peace, stability, and development are to be ensured. The task of designing policies and programs to achieve these objectives is complicated, however, by the scarcity of policy-relevant research on the rule of law in Mali. This scarcity is, at least in part, a reflection of the fact that before the crisis promoting the rule of law was not a major concern with respect to development programming.¹ This does not mean that the rule of law before the crisis was free of problems or, by implication, that the current problems are the result of the crisis. To the contrary, it will be argued that the absence of the state, its inability to provide security, and, in particular, the malfunctioning of the justice system each contributed to the crisis.²

This paper, which is primarily based on field research conducted in Mali in October 2013, aims to fill some of these knowledge gaps and thus to provide guidance to those responsible for developing the policies and programs to rebuild the Malian justice system. The objective of the research was to identify the most pressing issues concerning justice and human security in Mali in preparation for a larger quantitative study on these matters that will be launched in 2014. The core of the research consisted of a series of more than seventy-five interviews with local leaders from the central and northern Mali, specifically, the regions of Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu, Mopti, and Ségou.³ The image presented of the priorities in terms of justice and human security in Mali, therefore, are substantially informed by views from below.

The absence of the state, its inability to provide security, and, in particular, the malfunctioning of the justice system each contributed to the crisis.

Context Analysis

For many, the crisis of 2012 came as a surprise because the country was generally seen as a beacon of democracy and stability. Still, since it gained independence in the 1960s, Mali has had a history of ethno-political tensions that periodically escalate into violent insurgency.⁴ Most important, early in the 1990s a rebellion broke out in the north among Tuareg groups. This happened against a background of long-standing resentment by the Tuareg of their continued and increasing marginalization, severe and prolonged droughts that resulted in famine, and the influx of Tuareg fighters returning from Libya's war with Chad.⁵ Although fighting continued for some years afterward, the rebellion subsided after a peace deal—the National Pact—was struck with part of the rebel movements in 1992. To understand the current situation well, it is useful to consider subsequent developments in the 1990s and 2000s in some detail.

Although serious and sustained efforts were made to implement elements of the National Pact, the agreement failed to produce many tangible results.⁶ The decentralization program, though long the hallmark of Malian democratization, did not result in substantial devolution of power and thus fell short of northern demands for autonomy.⁷ Moreover, commissions intended to investigate abuses and human rights violations committed during the rebellion never became functional; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants proved difficult and contentious; and the efforts made to develop the north were insufficient to meet both needs and expectations. Ultimately, tensions between various northern communities, including different Tuareg groups, and between the north and the south were not fully assuaged and economic conditions in the north remained difficult.

Even before these events, the presence of the Malian state in the north was relative: a measure of lawlessness characterized the vast and difficult-to-control area.⁸ In the early 2000s, levels of crime, violence, and terrorism began to rise as a result of

a combination of external and internal dynamics.⁹ The Algerian terrorist resistance movement Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), which later became al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and its predecessor the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) had long smuggled cigarettes through the Sahel region. Groups based in the north of Mali, including the Tuareg, were reportedly associated with it.¹⁰

This trade expanded in several ways.¹¹ Smuggling was extended to include other illegal goods, mainly cocaine from South America bound for Europe and cannabis from Morocco bound for the Levant. The GSPC in particular also began kidnapping tourists in Algeria. When the Algerian government launched an offensive against the GSPC, it was driven into Mali's north, where it continued kidnapping Westerners.¹² Partly because of the reduced presence of the Malian military in the region, an effect of the National Pact, other groups of criminals and Islamic extremists were able to establish themselves in the region, copy these practices, and attract local recruits.¹³ This activity further undermined development and reconstruction efforts and had devastating effects on tourism.

State officials and senior officers were, reportedly, heavily implicated in these criminal and terrorist activities.¹⁴ The Malian leadership used its close involvement in the trade to exert influence in the north and to keep Tuareg rebel movements in check. It did so by forming alliances with northern business leaders and elites (including Tuareg) who competed with (other) Tuareg groups linked to the secessionist forces. Some set up government-supported militias to protect their interests. Deep state complicity in crime and laxity toward terrorism arguably go a long way to explain why the issue of a weak rule of law and institutional capacity, which in fact allowed the trade to flourish, were never seriously addressed.

Eventually, given the very large profits to be made, the rivalries between the groups involved in these activities spiraled out of control and led to an escalation of violence and insecurity.¹⁵ At the same time, the Tuareg resistance movements were

emboldened and strengthened by fighters returning from Libya, who had taken weapons from Qaddafi's arms depots.¹⁶ When, in 2012, under increasing international pressure, Malian authorities sent the army back to address the problems of terrorism and crime, civil war broke out and rebels proclaimed the independent state of Azawad in the north. Lower-ranking factions of the army, discontent about their meager share in the illegal revenues and angered by the way in which the insurgency was being handled, overthrew the government. As the jihadists, who in many ways had taken over the lead in the rebellion, moved farther south, France decided to intervene.

The French intervention brought an end to the occupation of the major cities in central and northern Mali. It did not, however, either defeat or neutralize the insurgents. A presidential election was held in July 2013 without major incident. In the months since, however, the jihadists—some operating from hideouts in the mountains and the desert, and others apparently from within the population—have mounted a series of attacks and suicide bombings, targeting the Malian army, the population, and infrastructure. At the same time, peace talks with secular Tuareg groups are moving forward, but not without difficulty. At the end of September 2013, the main groups pulled out of the talks until the government gave in to their demands to release twenty-three of their members from detention and annul their indictments. Some 200,000 members of the civilian population, mainly from the north, remain in camps in neighboring countries, and a similar number are internally displaced. The French, who remain active in the region with some 3,000 troops, are set to reduce their presence by two-thirds; meanwhile, the UN peacekeeping force, the Minusma, is operating at about half of its intended strength of 12,600 men.

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Lawlessness and Corruption

As the new government and its international partners develop their plans to rebuild the state's capacity to administer justice, considerable emphasis is understandably being put on the need to address crimes committed during the crisis through transitional justice mechanisms to ensure that they do not go unpunished. The research reported on here, however, suggests that impunity needs to be addressed far more broadly.

Our respondents were asked to share their views on the most important security threats faced by the population (direct physical and psychological effects, but also in terms of mobility and income, and on social cohesion); the origin of these problems, their evolution in time, and their relation to the crisis; and the role of the state and the justice system, in particular, in addressing these problems. In response to the question about security threats, respondents from the north (mainly from the regions of Gao and Timbuktu) pointed at the acts of terrorism currently carried out in their territory. By way of example, a bridge near the town of Gao was

blown up by suspected jihadists the day the mayor of this locality was interviewed. He commented extensively on the effects of this event on his constituents. In addition, shortly before we spoke with him, the house of a mayor from the region of Timbuktu was attacked because he had given an interview on France 24.

The other major security concern mentioned by almost all respondents in all of the five regions studied, was a broader problem that they generally referred to in terms of banditry (banditisme). Regional differences in terms of the forms that such banditry takes, its intensity, and its evolution in time appear to be considerable. In the regions of Mopti and Ségou, less touched by crisis, the problem mainly manifests itself in the form of organized and armed cattle theft, which can deeply affect the families and communities concerned. In individual localities, such theft occurs regularly, but with considerable time intervals (weeks or months), and mainly takes place under the cover of darkness. Hijackings, car theft, and motor bike theft also happen in these regions, but are much less common than in the three regions farther north, where these practices were reported to occur daily or weekly and often in broad daylight. Other examples, cited predominantly by respondents from northern regions, were attacks on merchants and other people traveling to markets, open attacks on markets, roadblocks being used to stop cars and buses and to rob passengers of their possessions, and in some cases rape. Discussions with respondents from the north also made clear that the distinction between acts of terrorism and these forms of banditry is difficult because, in their view, the perpetrators are often the same.

It became clear that, though they may have escalated afterwards, these problems predate the crisis of 2012. Some respondents reported that they became intense from 2008 onward, but others related them to the failed Algiers Peace Accord of 2006 or to the first half of the decade. Respondents were generally quick to relate the existence of these problems to the absence of the state, its inability to provide security, and, in particular, the malfunctioning of

the justice system. In the north, this system has effectively been dismantled, but its performance before the crisis was said to be very poor. On the whole, respondents from all regions described the system as weak, in that it is often incapable or its agents too intimidated to track and apprehend the perpetrators. Respondents also qualified it as highly corrupt, suggesting that when necessary the police, prosecutors, and judges could always be persuaded to suspend investigations, make a case go away, or release a detainee or convict. Some suggested that officials were, in some way or other, involved in or gave tacit support to such crimes. Under such conditions, gangs of criminals, whether independent or allied to rebels or jihadists, can act with impunity.

Because none of our respondents mentioned this problem of their own accord, they were specifically asked whether and to what extent illegal trafficking posed a threat to security. Particularly in the three northern regions, this traffic is well known and was said to continue without interference to this day. Still, it is not very visible because it primarily involves unmarked trucks passing through the territory and the illegal merchandise does not come onto the local market. Several respondents, however, saw it as a significant indirect security threat. Traffickers generate huge profits, which, at least before the crisis, were invested in ostentatious buildings, luxurious shops, and expensive cars. Respondents explained that this very visible display of wealth, the origins of which are well known locally, tends to incite youths, who have few other attractive economic prospects, to join gangs and groups of militants and thus to exacerbate the situation generally. In respondents' view, the problem was compounded by the influx of arms that accompanied the growth in the drug trade.

In the course of the discussions on banditry and lawlessness or impunity, a relatively small but significant number of respondents, from all three northern regions, but mainly from Gao, expressed views about what happened during the crisis that bear careful consideration. Despite their disapproval of crimes and acts of terrorism committed by the rebels and jihadists during and after the occupation,

these respondents emphasized that the coming of the jihadists in particular had brought much needed order. They placed harsh forms of punishments in the context of continuous and often violent and intimidating crime and suggested that, in their view, jihadist justice was better than no justice if it protected the population. A small minority added that at least the justice dispensed by the jihadists was not inspired by the desire to fill their pockets. A number of respondents from the north, in particular from the region of Kidal, stressed that lawlessness and corruption were at the core of the grievances that had culminated in the crisis.

This suggests a divergence in the way that transitional justice is thought of and spoken about in Bamako and the north.

These findings, though tentative, have several implications. First, in terms of their effect on the population, current acts of terror concentrated in the north are part of a broader problem of widespread, violent, and often organized and armed crime that has plagued northern and central Mali since well before the crisis. The absence of legitimate, effective, and fair law enforcement to deal with these problems is central to the narrative used to explain the crisis in the north. Second, the targets of crime and acts of terror are in many cases objects with economic value. This suggests that the problems of lawlessness and corruption affect the prospects for economic development, which the north desperately needs. Third, in view of Mali's history of failed peace agreements,¹⁷ the question is whether the outcome of the current peace talks, whatever they might be, can be expected to hold if the problems with lawlessness and corruption are not effectively addressed.

This brings us to a final point on the issue of transitional justice. All respondents tended to agree that dialogue was needed at both the national and the local level, between communities, to foster peace and reconciliation. In doing so, many respondents, though certainly not all, emphasized the need also to prosecute those who had committed crimes during the crisis. When they were pressed on this issue, however, it became clear that in saying this most were in fact calling for the insurgents to be punished for the fact that they had taken up arms. In this regard, only a handful of respondents explicitly spoke about crimes (mainly rape and harsh corporal punishments) committed during the crisis. This suggests a divergence in the way that transitional justice is thought of and spoken about in Bamako and the north.

Policy Recommendations

As noted, the absence of legitimate, effective, and fair law enforcement and the extent of corruption in the security forces and the justice system are an important part of how respondents explained the crisis in the north. This must probably be understood to reflect the level of insecurity that the population currently feels. Care should be taken not to overstate the role of lawlessness and corruption as direct causes of the events of 2012 and early 2013, however, or to inflate the effectiveness of promoting the rule of law to address instability in the north.

As we have seen, this instability is caused by a complex set of interlinking factors, some of which clearly originate in broader dynamics affecting the Sahel region as a whole or individual neighboring countries. The absence of a legitimate, effective, and fair justice system is part of this complex of problems. In particular, it fueled and continues to fuel incentives to engage in drug trafficking and other illegal practices, and it is at least part of the

reason that Islamist groups were able to find a safe haven in northern Mali from which to continue and expand their operations. In addition, the violence and crime it engendered have contributed to anger and resentment among the population, which has led some to join or support the insurgents, and others to be quite skeptical about current prospects for peace and stability. Finally, indications are clear that this violence and crime hinder the prospects for economic development.

Promoting the rule of law, therefore, is a critical element in plans for Mali's reconstruction. Yet the timing of programs to improve justice and security and the coordination with efforts to deal with other dimensions of instability and underdevelopment are key. Arguably, in the three northern regions, promoting the rule of law can lead to tangible results in reducing impunity, improving citizens' security, and fighting corruption only if it can build on a political solution that, in the eyes of the population, bestows a basic level of trustworthiness and legitimacy on the state institutions responsible for law enforcement. Similarly, it requires that the most serious security threat—that from the various armed groups—to be substantially reduced. For these reasons, successfully implementing the following recommendations to strengthen the rule of law is likely to be considerably more challenging in the three northern regions than in central Mali.

Link justice and security

It is difficult to deal effectively with impunity if the justice sector and the security sector remain separate as they are now. This linkage should be reflected in the institutional architecture that the government and donors create to consult each other and assess their progress. The Justice Law and Order Sectors instituted in Uganda and Rwanda are good examples of how this could be done.¹⁸ This link should be reflected in the programs that the government and donors develop to deal with the problems at hand. It should also be reflected in design of the studies commissioned to better understand the problems and to improve programming. A study of the performance of the

penal chain that emphasizes the experiences of justice seekers, for example, does not go far enough. Such a study should also consider how well the institutions concerned perform in terms of their primary role in society, which is to guarantee order, personal security, and legal certainty. This requires a survey among the general population about their justice and security needs. Looking only at the system and its users is not likely to bring into focus the many important security problems the system now inadequately deals with or the groups that cannot gain access to it.

Emphasize prevention

When it comes to programming in the justice and security sectors, the emphasis appears to be on rebuilding and strengthening capacities to react to crime only after it has occurred. That is, the focus is on the capacity to detect, investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate crime and to enforce sentences. The findings presented above tell us that such programs are highly necessary. Still, it was also suggested that the institutions responsible for law enforcement are seen as deeply corrupt. Rooting this corruption out will be difficult and time-consuming. It seems realistic to expect that this situation will continue to complicate efforts to fight impunity. Under such circumstances, it makes sense to invest in prevention as a complementary strategy. Prevention would lead to less insecurity and fewer cases left unaddressed. It also leaves more room for the institutions responsible for law enforcement to make better use of the limited resources at their disposal.

Experiment with community policing

Prevention can be organized in two ways: organizing patrols for surveillance purposes and detecting and resolving conflicts early on (such as about land or cattle) that frequently escalate into violence. The Association des Municipalités du Mali (Malian Association of Municipalities) is set to pilot a community policing project (in the region of Mopti or Ségou) to try to achieve these aims. In numerous places in rural Mali, the population forms night brigades to provide a basic level of security. The idea is to bring such

initiatives more directly under the control of local authorities, to professionalize them, and to establish a good working relation with the national police. Some concern is warranted, because in the past such brigades have developed into full-fledged armed militias that became part of the insecurity problem. Still, because these brigades are already present in many locations and the purpose is to try to bring them under administrative control and ensure that they benefit the population, reasons to experiment on a small scale seem strong. The pilot also involves activities to strengthen existing mechanisms on which community leaders rely to prevent and solve intercommunity conflict, such as by meeting to establish corridors through agricultural country that herders can use when the seasons change to bring their cattle to new pastures.

Improve accountability and participation

Linking justice and security also means that the institutions responsible for law enforcement become more responsive to the security needs of the population and offer assurance both that basic norms will be respected and that the law will be applied fairly. One way to foster accountability and participation is to institute court user committees, as has been tested in Kenya and Malawi. In the unstable border areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo (South Kivu) and Burundi a consortium of Dutch NGOs, led by Cordaid, is pioneering a way to take this approach a step further.¹⁹ The idea being tested is to link part of the funding of justice and security sector institutions to their performance and to give the population a direct say both in the definition of performance and in periodically assessing it. Whether either of these two approaches could be replicated or emulated in the Malian context is worth examining.

Improve communication with justice seekers

Effectively fighting impunity and becoming more responsive also requires effectively communicating the results of the work of law enforcers to the parties concerned and the public. This can be

illustrated by considering the plans for transitional justice. A prosecutor and court in Bamako (of Commune III) have been made competent to try cases concerning crimes committed during the crisis. A few NGOs are working to prepare case files and have collected information all over Mali and in neighboring countries about several hundred cases. In many of these cases, especially the most serious, it appears that the victim (who will frequently be displaced or in refugee camps), the alleged perpetrator (who is often unknown and in an unknown location), and the place where the crime was committed and the public was affected are far away both from each other and from Bamako. If these trials are to help Malian society deal with the past, ways must be found to ensure that information about them is spread widely, for example, through accessible media such as radio. The same applies to the administration of justice and law enforcement in general. Such programs could also serve as a platform for public debates about the justice needs of the population.

Invest in a better understanding of corruption in the justice system

Fighting corruption is one of the primary concerns for the Malian population, in the south as well as the north, and the new government has made this one of its top priorities. Corruption comes in many forms, including embezzlement of public funds (donor money), electoral fraud, and improper administration of justice. Arguably it is the last that most directly affects the population.²⁰ Although the problems with the administration of justice were well known, in the past, the emphasis in the fight against corruption was on public finance management and few concrete measures were taken or even proposed to root out corruption in the justice system.²¹ To address this problem effectively, a much deeper understanding of it must be developed. A number of salient questions need to be studied and answered:

- Where is the problem concentrated (police, prosecutors, clerks, judges, prisons and detention centers)?
- What forms does it take (false acquittals, false

condemnations, abusive incarceration used to tax the population or to help friendly parties to settle scores or collect debts, and so on)?

- Which of these affect the population most and in what ways?
- Do viable, affordable, and acceptable solutions exist?
- How can victims, suspects, and the population be empowered to stand up against corruption in the justice sector?
- What measures can be taken to create less room for such practices strengthening checks and balances in a smart way?

Comprehensively address intercommunity conflict

To ensure that the peace being negotiated at national level is rooted locally, a number of donors are preparing to give support to initiatives to organize dialogues on peace and reconciliation in numerous Malian municipalities. This makes a lot of sense. Many municipalities are made up of at least several communities living in close proximity. The research reported here clearly shows that the bulk of these municipalities are characterized by recurring conflicts, mainly about land and cattle, that cause tensions between the communities. Yet it is not likely that the divisions or tensions that exist within Malian society more broadly can effectively be addressed at municipality level, especially when communities from entirely different regions are concerned. For example, many people living in central Mali appear to have very negative sentiments about the Tuareg and the Arabs of the north. In periods of insecurity and economic hardship, such divisions can harden and escalate into conflict and violence. In particular, politicians and other leaders may be tempted to exploit such divisions, by blaming the distress on the other group, to increase support in their community. Such dynamics are well known in countries like Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. A number of international NGOs, notably Radio La Benevolencija and Search for Common

Ground, have had a fair amount of success in these countries with programs aimed at strengthening the capacities of the population to recognize and resist such processes of stigmatization and at giving a human face to the other group.²² These programs use mass media in innovative ways that secure a wide reach among the population and leaders. Again, it is worth examining whether such an approach could be replicated or emulated in the Malian context.

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Endnotes

- 1 | It is not suggested that the rule of law was completely neglected. In 2003, notably, the office of the Auditor General was created and an important reform of the justice system was launched (see *Avocats Sans Frontières Canada*, “De la Crise à une Paix Durable : La Justice et les Droits Humains dans un Contexte de Transition au Mali,” August 2, 2013, p.10, <http://www.asfcanada.ca/documents/file/rapport-justice-transitionnelle-mali-vfr-2013-08-19.pdf>).
- 2 | In conducting the field research, it became clear that the term *the crisis* (la crise) is used in different ways in Mali. In some cases, it refers to the relatively short and well-defined period of the open rebellion by a combination of secular and Islamist groups and their occupation in 2012 and the beginning of 2013 of northern and much of central Mali. In other cases, it is used more broadly, to describe the steady accumulation and escalation of problems that resulted in increasing instability and eventually led to the rebellion and the occupation. In many ways, these problems remain unresolved. It is therefore not surprising that the term is also and often used to refer to the present situation, which is characterized by high levels of insecurity, continued fighting, and uneasy peace talks.
- 3 | As suggested, the study consisted of a quick scan. The local leaders interviewed included mayors, municipal councilors, and traditional leaders (*chefs de village, chefs de quartier, and chefs de fraction*). Still, it is not suggested that our interviewees necessarily provided a representative and unbiased account of the problems in terms of security and justice. Given the relatively low number of respondents, the approach was essentially qualitative. Therefore no claim is made that the findings are representative.
- 4 | Mériadec Raffray, “La Révolte des Hommes Bleus, 1857-2013” (Paris : Economica, 2013).
- 5 | The parallels between the events of the early 1990s and those of 2012 are striking. For a more detailed discussion that emphasizes the role of the donor community, see Marije Balt and Marco Lankhorst, “Assisting Peacebuilding in Mali: Avoiding the Mistakes of the Past,” The Hague Institute for Global Justice Policy Brief, September 2013, http://thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/cp/uploads/publications/Policy-Brief-5-Assisting-Peacebuilding-in-Mali_1380818776.pdf.
- 6 | Susanna D. Wing, “Mali’s Precarious Democracy and the Causes of Conflict,” *United States Institute of Peace* Special Report no. 331, April 19, 2013, <http://www.usip.org/publications/mali-s-precarious-democracy-and-the-causes-of-conflict>; Rick Gold, “Initiatives for Peace in Northern Mali in the 1990’s - Lessons Learned,” *A Contrario*, February 13, 2013, <http://acontrarioicl.com/2013/02/13/initiatives-for-peace-in-northern-mali-in-the-1990s-lessons-learned/>; and Balt and Lankhorst, “Assisting Peacebuilding in Mali”, n.5.
- 7 | Wing, “Mali’s Precarious Democracy,” n.6; Oivind Hetland, “The Politics of Decentralisation Reform in Mali: Democratisation, State-Society Relations, and Local Governance” (PhD thesis, University of Oslo, 2007), <https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/15266/dravhandling-hetland-inkl-art.pdf?sequence=2>.
- 8 | Wing, “Mali’s Precarious Democracy,” n.6; Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region,” *The Carnegie Papers*, September 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sahel_sahara.pdf.
- 9 | Wing, “Mali’s Precarious Democracy,” n.6; Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict,” n.8; Balt and Lankhorst, “Assisting Peacebuilding in Mali”, n.5.
- 10 | Jeremy Keenan, “The Banana Theory of Terrorism: Alternative Truths and the Collapse of the ‘Second’ (Saharan) Front in the War on Terror,” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 25, no. 1 (2007): 31-58.
- 11 | Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict,” n.8.
- 12 | Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat,” *Carnegie Papers* no. 104, October 2009, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/al-qaeda_islamic_maghreb.pdf; Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict,” n.8; Stephen Harmon, “From GSPC to AQIM: The Evolution of an Algerian Islamist

- Terrorist Group into an Al-Qa'ida Affiliate and its Implications for the Sahara-Sahel region," *ACAS Bulletin* no. 85, Spring 2010, p.12, <http://concernedafricascholars.org/docs/bulletin85harmon.pdf>
- 13 | Filiu, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," n.12; Lacher, "Organized Crime and Conflict," n.8.
- 14 | Lacher, "Organized Crime and Conflict," n.8; Balt and Lankhorst, "Assisting Peacebuilding in Mali", n.5.
- 15 | Ibid.
- 16 | J. Peter Pham, "Mali: No Way to Go to a War Going Nowhere," *Atlantic Council*, January 14, 2013.
- 17 | Notably, the Tamanrasset peace agreement of 1991 and Algiers peace agreement of 2006 (see Balt and Lankhorst, "Assisting Peacebuilding in Mali", n.5).
- 18 | For an introduction to the sector approach in Uganda, see <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=100989>; for the Rwandan sector strategy, see http://www.unicef.org/rwanda/events_9506.html.
- 19 | For more information on this project, see <http://www.cordaid.org/en/projects/improve-local-security-and-justice-systems/106191/>.
- 20 | Avocats Sans Frontières Canada, "De la Crise à une Paix Durable," 11, n.1.
- 21 | Marie Chène, "Overview of corruption and government's efforts against corruption in Mali," Report by the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center and *Transparency International*, March 7, 2008; <http://issuu.com/cmi-norway/docs/expert-helpdesk-159?e=1246952/3092330#search>.
- 22 | For Radio Labenevolencija's methodology, see <http://www.labenevolencija.org/la-benevolencija/mission-and-vision/methodology/>; for Search for Common Ground's regional strategy for the Great Lakes Region (Rwanda, Burundi, Congo), see http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/drcongo/drcongo_ggl.html.



The Hague Institute
for Global Justice

Sophialaan 10, 2514 JR The Hague, The Netherlands
t +31 (0)70 30 28 130 | e info@TheHagueInstitute.org | [@HagueInstitute](https://twitter.com/HagueInstitute)
w TheHagueInstitute.org