

Reimagining Social Contracts

An analytical paper of KPSRL discussions in 2022

Executive Summary

- In this paper, '**social contract**' refers to the process by which people in positions and institutions of power (including formal and informal authorities) and people and organisations challenging for power and social change (including the youth), make promises to or agreements with society that raise expectations that, when met, bind them in a relationship of consent and cooperation.
- Human security, people-centred justice, and community-based approaches, grounded in the respect, promotion and protection of human rights, clearly emerged from KPAC sessions as what should be promised and delivered (and what is often not currently delivered) in the security and rule of law sector. But the KPSRL network recognized that '**authoritarian bargains**' have been a stable form of social contract in many countries. Here, leaders attain limited legitimacy – though combined with force, suppression, or patriotic ideals – through socioeconomic growth and security for the majority, which is prioritized over liberties, political participation, and equal rights.
- Against the allure of authoritarian bargains, the KPSRL network has emphasized the alternative of '**inclusive**' social contracts. This concept captures the idea that marginalized voices should systematically be involved in collective political decision making. 'Inclusive' means here that different groups in society have the means and power to influence and change policy to address their needs and concerns.
- **Informal 'horizontal' social contracts** are often present in which communities connect through the mediation of structures parallel to the State. The KPSRL network suggested a restructuring and rethinking of security and rule of law policy and practice to build on such informal institutions and arrangements, where they are present and important, in a transformative manner and consistent with evolving needs of communities.
- **Protest movements** emerged as a key tool to renegotiate social contracts, and the youth has a key role in social and political movements.
- **International partnerships** to strengthen and re-imagine social contracts should be revisited within the current discourse on decolonizing development, humanitarian aid and peacebuilding.
- Policymakers and programming partners should use **intersectional lenses and prioritize granular local knowledge** to map social and political systems for entry points to strengthen and re-imagine inclusive social contracts, adapting policy to support these aspirations.
- **Inclusive and responsive institutions**, both formal and informal, **that deliver essential functions in security and justice systems** and enable minimum standards of service delivery are key elements of long-term processes of trust building. Where possible, these institutions should be supported to operate on existing plans, available capacities, and diverse expertise, including indigenous ones. If existing plans are absent or reinforce existing inequalities, support should be prioritized for social and political movements emerging from and rooted in these countries that ask for inclusive and responsive institutions. There is a need for diversified partnerships with national and sub-national government counterparts, representative civil society (and NGOs) organizations, and grassroots movements, social movements, and the private sector.

Introduction

KPSRL's 2022 thematic headline was '[Reimagining Social Contracts](#)'; a theme that guided a kick-off webinar, a window of the Knowledge Management Fund (KMF) and the Annual Conference ([KPAC22](#)). This paper takes stock of the multiple insights on reimagining the social contract(s) that emerged in these activities as a springboard for continuing the conversation in 2023.

The paper was written by the KPSRL Secretariat with input from KPAC22 session hosts, KMF grantees, and the wider KPSRL network, and will discuss the following topics:

- A definition of social contract(s) as analytical concept, reconstructed from multiple contributions from the KPSRL network
- Processes for supporting inclusive social contracts, which emerged as one ideal form of social contracts
- The divide between formal and informal sources of authority and power.
- The connection between social contracts and social norms
- The role of protest movements in contesting social contracts
- The role of international partnerships, putting centre-stage issues of decolonisation and the development of more equitable partnerships
- Implications for policymakers and practitioners, and areas where the conversation could continue in 2023

Observations

The concept of “social contract” was appealing to the KPSRL because of its flexibility. It seemed to hold potential to make visible the consequences of critical moments and trends in a society (positive and negative) for peace, justice, and social cooperation. Most people directly experienced crises such as the Covid 19 pandemic, the crisis in Ukraine and its connected energy and inflation crisis, Brexit, the Trump Presidency, the rising right-wing populism and extremism, and the refugee crisis of the period 2012-2016. The concept of the social contract was attractive to shed some lights on origins and consequences of this sort of crisis for social and political cooperation. Additionally, in a context of democratic retreat across the World, the social contract seemed a useful analytical tool to describe and understand why political orders were stable, even though they were not supposed to be according to standard liberal democracy models. Moreover, to some international development actors and more recently, the social contract seemed to hold an ideal of stability and inclusivity for intervening in contexts that were neither, as well as helpful to connect diverse sectoral interventions on the road to peace. On the critical side, the concept seemed capacious enough to accommodate the critiques to traditional political and social organization advanced by environmental, feminist, anti-racist, anti-colonial, and anti-ageist movements.

The 2022 trajectory started addressing some of the knowledge gaps connected to unlocking the concept's potential as an analytical concept, an ideal, and revolutionary critique of standing political order. The trajectory launched a rather wide exploration from the vantage point of the KPSRL network, without offering an initial definition or conceptualization. This paper contains the fruits of this broad launch, conscious that the trajectory continuation in 2023 will need to build on this by going deeper in unlocking the practical value of the social contract concept for SRoL policy, programming, and partnerships.

Definition of social contract(s)

In the peace and justice sector, the social contract concept suffers from both over and under-conceptualisation. On the one hand, the concept is part of a centuries long history of thought which was at times problematic and difficult to grasp. On the other hand, the concept has not been sufficiently operationalized yet for use in international development policy and practice.

Neither KPAC22 nor KMF grants directly covered a definition of the 'social contract' as a concept. This was partly intentional as the KPSRL Secretariat realized that exploring the long history of the social contract inside Western political philosophy would have marginalized non-Western perspectives. Nevertheless, in discussion with KPAC22 session leads, we identified the need to add a working definition, which was reconstructed by exploring definitions, perspectives, and issues implicit in KPAC22's sessions and our kick-off webinar.

In the context of this paper, '**social contract**' refers to the process by which people in positions of power (including both formal and informal authorities) and people and organizations challenging for power and social change, make promises to or agreements with society that raise expectations on the exercise of political authority. When these expectations are met, authority is considered across society to be legitimate, which builds consent and cooperation.

Indeed, that we imagine explicit promises or agreements or something more fluid like shared cultural beliefs or customs does not matter much for the concept. Key is instead the creation through those processes of reasonable and shared expectations in society about how political powers is supposed to be used and which political goals should be delivered with it. It is these expectations that, if met, create relationships of trust, consent, and cooperation, and when not met might lead to contestation.

Peace, security, and justice were discussed as outcomes that emerge from a stable and inclusive social contract, and as inputs and conditions for the recursive process of social contract formation. Human security, people-centred justice, and community-based approaches have clearly emerged from KPAC sessions as what should be promised and delivered (and what is often not currently delivered) as inputs for social contract formation. Examples of KPAC sessions that argued this are PATHFINDERS' Justice for All is Vital for Repairing the Social Contract, CARE NEDERLAND - HAC BURUNDI's "Building Peace Through Community-led Structures," and MENSEN MET EEN MISSIE's "Re-thinking our Collaboration with Communities on PVE/CVE." The security and justice sectors, however, have another connection to the concept, that of placing penalty of repression on dissent.

Focusing for the moment on consensual processes of social contract formation, **the social contract places emphasis on transactional approach to legitimate power.** It can be said that society accepts what is promised when the bundle of give and take, of rights and duties, of services provided, freedom, and responsibility is judged to be right. It is another matter to judge whether what is promised and delivered is also what is needed in changing contexts, as, for example, IDLO and International IDEA's "Rearranging social contract in response to climate change" argued for the case of the response to the climate crisis.

Indeed, **context-bound values and ideas shape what people judge to be important, right, and fair.** Because of this, the social contract concept can be used to analyse and better understand why groups of

people in societies have struck certain (un)stable social contracts, irrespective of whether the foreign intervener agrees that these social contracts are right or fair. For example, DCAF & UN University – MERIT’s session “Rethink State-Nation Relationships for Sound Human Security” discussed from this perspective authoritarian bargains in the MENA region.

The opening and closing KPAC sessions, Leiden University College’s “Whether Social Protest Movements Contribute to Re-imagining the Social Contract?” and Re: Orient & MENASA’ Imagine Madaniya! made the point that **social contracts should be understood as contested**. A wide variety of actors advance conflicting visions of social cooperation, both when in power and when trying to marshal social support to contest for power. Promises can be accepted or contested based on divergent values, interests and experiences. Some actors aim to challenge traditional understandings of right and wrong and some defend them. Some demand effective implementation of existing legislation and policies, and some wish to delay full implementation. KPAC22 session “Voices from the MENA about the Civil State”, for example, opened a rich window on public discussions around contested ideas and visions of society in the MENA region.

Public policies, programmes, and organizations or institutions, as well as the private sector are tools to deliver on promises made, but none of them is by itself THE social contract. No historical moment or specific process can be pinpointed as having ‘settled’ or ‘delivered’ on the social contract, even though historical moments and actual processes can be identified as entry points to shift the social system and lead to concrete improvements or regression in policy frameworks, practices, and ideas. KPAC sessions such as Jasmine Foundation - THUAS/ISS’s “Can Social Accountability Initiatives Reshape Social Contracts?” and LANDAc’s “Land Registration and the Local Social Contract” explored some of the public policy tools that can be used to deliver and maintain accountability on promises and expectations.

The social contract is entangled with the concept of (in)equality, as different people and countries have bundles of resources and technologies that are influenced by historical exploitation and influence what is possible (to be promised and delivered). The social contract, as an ideal, is to a tool to reflect on inequality, because it asks to reflect on which promises and agreements would be considered just and fair across society. However, unequal relationships are embedded in practical processes of social contract formation. For example, Pathfinder’s session has explored how technological change can expand the frontier of what is possible, and the private sector’s role, not always positive, in this, TMC Asser Institute’s “International Law and the Social Stratification of States” discussed inequality between States in the international legal order, and Radboud University’s “Aiding the Social Contract” problematized interventions by foreign actors in domestic processes of social contract formation and contestation.

[Inclusive social contracts](#)

The earlier definition of a social contract already alludes to the fact that **establishing a social contract is a complex and long-term process**. It is shaped by decades, if not centuries of social struggle, economic or geographic (dis)advantages, religious fault lines and technological progress. Such a complex formation process obviously does not fit classic ODA project cycles, so a ‘social contract mindset’ requires thinking beyond projects, combined with a decent dose of humility in terms of your sphere of influence and your interfering position within these relationships.

Some KPAC sessions such as DCAF’s, Cordaid’s and SIPRI’s “Revising SSR: Towards a Realistic Approach in Conflict-Affected Environment” stressed that external support to transforming core pillars of the social

contract, such as the justice and security sector, requires a basic level of stability. What is certain, is that changes in the social contract provoke discomfort and friction, as this always collides with a transformation of power.

The liberal democracy model declined in prominence for many developing countries in the past two decades. Countries that introduced some elements of the liberal democratic model have seen limited ‘democratic dividends,’ coming as much from flawed reforms (trappings of democracy without the requisite transparency and accountability) as from limitations and flaws in the model itself. Among such flaws is its propensity to generate or exacerbate inequalities, leaving part of the population to fend for itself. Even less flattering are the arguments that the Western model lost legitimacy through intrusive wars, flouting of international rule of law and human rights, misplaced attempts to parachute its political model in countries that did not ask for it, extractive international business, top-down development cooperation, and enduring colonial mindsets.

The KPSRL network, for example in DCAF and UN MERIT’s KPAC22 session, recognized that **‘authoritarian bargains’** have been a stable form of social contract in many countries. Here, leaders attain legitimacy – though often combined with force and repression – through socioeconomic growth and security for the majority, which is prioritized over civic liberties, meaningful political participation, and equal rights.

Against the allure of authoritarian bargains, the KPSRL network has emphasized the alternative of **‘inclusive’ social contracts**, such as in CARE NL’s and HAC Burundi’s “Building Peace Through Community-led Structures.’ This concept captures the idea that the elitism, dominance of large business, and inequality that is often a part of classical liberal democracy should be mitigated by a deliberate focus to include marginalized voices in political processes and decision-making. The ‘inclusive’ adjective means that different groups in society have the means and power to influence and change policy to address their needs and concerns (inclusive processes), but also receive equal benefits from collective services (inclusive outcomes). Of course, an inclusive social contract can still come in many forms.

For SRoL, this for example means that governance that impacts security and justice is participatory and rights-based, and security actors respond to the needs of all parts of the population, while being held accountable in an impartial justice system – formal or informal. In discussing this ideal version of the social contract, KPAC22 has included the voices of critical activists that emphasized that Western democracies do not meet this more demanding benchmark either. International actors also don’t always walk the inclusive talk by prioritizing stability or excluding actors at the negotiating table that do not share the same values or interests.

Formal and informal institutions

Both when using the social contract as an analytical tool and when working towards viable social contracts, of which the inclusive social contract is one, it is important to recognize that many fragile and conflict affected settings are **‘hybrid’ political orders that combine customary, informal forms of governance with institutional forms that are more often associated with the Western state model.**

IDLO and International IDEA KPAC22 session, for example, highlighted the mounting failure of states to demonstrate their usefulness by providing basic services (such as health, education, and employment opportunities), effective and accessible justice and security, as well as resilience in face of climate shocks in many fragile settings. Therefore, rather than built on cooperation and trust through fulfilled promises, the relationship between people and the state becomes extractive on the part of the State, which justifies

its existence with narratives that emphasize intrinsic 'state authority', that the existence of the State is good in and of itself.

In cases where the State is weak, absent, or extractive, PAX, CRU and the Dutch MFA's KPAC22 session pointed to the possible existence of **'horizontal' social contracts in which communities enter into connections parallel to state structures**, and in which customary authorities deliver part of the responsibilities that in a Western model are assigned to the State. The KPSRL network suggested rethinking security and the rule of law policy and practice to build on such informal institutions and arrangements, where they are present and important, in a transformative manner and consistent with evolving needs of communities.

Instead of assuming that Western models of State-society relations are the most appropriate model and avenue to build robust social contracts, attention should be paid to models of governance that draw on the strengths of social order and resilience embedded in community life of the societies in question. Inclusive bottom-up approaches here means **inclusive of informal authorities** that are rooted in their communities, with joint frameworks for action between formal and informal institutions that create **resilience and robustness in the face of crises of formal authorities and meaningfully address the needs of those who remain excluded from formal systems**. Meaningful decentralization of responsibilities and resources to forms of governance that include informal structures help re-empower local communities in coming up with realistic and context-sensitive solutions, while building some level of deserved trust with the governments and contributing to robust social contracts. These forms of governance can include customary institutions, NGOs-both local or international, religious institutions (as emphasized in THE BROKER's "Working with Religious Actors for Sustainable Development" KPAC22 session), and of course state actors.

It is essential, however, to remain sensitive to potential perceptions around which structures are built, which can replicate inequalities at different levels. As pointed out by Landac and IDLO/International IDEA KPAC22 sessions, it is often assumed that formal systems of governance and justice are more equal and equitable compared to informal ones. However, this assumption is not always justified, because youth, women and IDPs among others tend to be less represented in politics and decision-making in both formal and customary systems.

The private sector is another actor that toes the line between the formal and informal. The Western liberal democratic model foresees a key role for the private sector in creating prosperity through economic opportunities and in delivering on public goals. Even in Western countries, however, the extent to which the private sector delivers on its social commitment is disputed. **KPAC22 held a plurality of opinions on the role of the private sector in delivering social contracts** (services, jobs, taxes, environment) and, specifically reforms in the justice sector. In Pathfinder's KPAC session, for example, opinions on the potential of the private sector in supporting reforms that can expand access to justice were mixed, with some seeing a positive and others cautioning against entrusting power and responsibility to actors that are essentially self-serving and self-focused.

KMF projects funded by the KPSRL on the topic found that in many FCAS the private sector is rarely seen as an essential stakeholder in major political settlements and peace negotiations, and in many cases it actively undermines public trust through corruption and the abuse of workers and entire communities in their operations. With such a perception, the question whether the private sector can play a positive role in reimagining the social contract of the societies in which it operates, remains. When providing directly

justice services, also in stable contexts, the private sector's profit motivation create issues of access to those services for those unable to pay for them.

The role of protest movements

KPAC22's opening and closing sessions, as well as other sessions such as Leiden University College's and Re: Orient & MENASA's recognized that **protest movements are a key tool to renegotiate social contracts, and that youth has a key role in social and political movements.**

The role of social movements has been discussed as an alternative to working with established, professional civil society organizations, which in some contexts might be disconnected from the most relevant demands emerging from the bottom up because of their financial relationship with donors and governments. Nevertheless, this raises practical challenges. GRIP's eBook "*Jeunesse urbaine, fracture générationnelle et réinvention du lien politique en Afrique subsaharienne*,"¹ presented the internal turmoil that citizen movements, which often form as loose and horizontal networks without a legal entity or management, go through when considering funding from NGOs. They must weight on one side the resources and on the other side the conditionalities and hierarchical and bureaucratic structure. Many international organization find challenging to work with these movements/groups as well, from a procurement, operations, and accountability perspective.

The opening session of KPAC23 discussed how the youth is often perceived as a threat to national social/generational hierarchies and therefore ignored in international policy circles, whereas the youth will be disproportionately affected by future challenges to the social contract such as climate change. Yet, young people are the centre of the social and political movements mentioned in the previous paragraph, challenging the status quo through peaceful protest, artistic expression, and online mobilisation. Young people's mobilisation is organised through movements, networks, and other systems that might not look like organisations.

Engaging with social movements and young people is an area where success and failure and timelines of programmes and projects must be problematized. Re: Orient & MENASA's session did this with key ideas that emerged from the Arab Spring movements. Success should not be defined only as political change that was achieved, but also as building a public vocabulary of ideas on which future actors can build.

Social contracts and social norms

The informal actors explored above might not be recognised in constitutional, political, or legal systems, but are still physical people or, at most, organisations. This section covers another factor that influences social contracts but which is more intangible.

Social norms are shared standards of acceptable behaviour by groups, and bundles of social norms make up social institutions such as gender, the family, patriarchy, and racial, age- and class-based ordering of people. Processes of social contract(s) formation and contestation necessarily deal with social norms when understood as long-term and complex interactions that bring together actors across the social spectrum.

¹ The eBook was funded through the Knowledge Management Fund is available on request.

As mentioned in Re:Orient session on the concept of Madaniya in the Arab Spring, such processes are at times about changing social norms and institutions themselves. Progressive and radical reformers fight upwards battles to challenge, innovate and transform social norms, and may come to see them as a barrier to meaningful political change. Conservatives pivot on established social norms to support their visions of society.

In other cases, social norms might be simply neutral standards that need to be understood and respected to engage effectively in public debates in a way that is context sensitive. Again from Re Orient & MENASA overview of discussions on the civil State in the MENA region, ‘civil state’ fitted the context better than the Western concept of ‘secular State’ because it was more in line with contextual social norms.

In cases where stability, security and cooperation have broken down due to conflict, it is possible to build positively on established social norms to reconstruct a measure of stability, security, and cooperation, as highlighted in the Broker’s session on religious actors involvement in peacebuilding.

International partnerships and decolonization

The fundamental premise of international development is that international partnerships can provide a positive value to partner countries, including fragile contexts. In fact, despite their inherent domestic nature, social contracts are, in one way or another, subject to the pressure of external forces, of which interventions aimed at strengthening the said social contracts are a special category (other forces are international business and international relations more broadly).

Despite their potential for good, PAX, CRU, and Dutch MFA KPAC session’s “Practice and Policy on Social Contracts and Burkina Faso” discussed how interventions aimed at strengthening social contracts often put **excessive focus on short-term results** at expense of long-term interests and investments. They **prioritize stability and security over rule of law, justice, and inclusiveness**. Further, they **target only formal institutions** (and their capabilities), without building on what is already known or exists in communities. By doing so, they risk doing harm by tilting the scales away from inclusive, balanced processes of internal negotiations. Programming interventions that are rooted in and framed using Western values, lenses, and knowledge systems can hamper ownership and legitimacy of power in non-Western contexts and undervalue local expertise and agency. This results in frail and aid dependent social contracts.

Additionally, the above mentioned interventions often target or are implemented within **justice and security systems shaped by European legal traditions and imposed on non-Western societies** during the process of colonization. In fact, although most people have come to recognize the terrible harms caused by colonialism, in many FCAS, systems underpinning security and rule of law remain existing holdovers from colonial period, serving specific/entrenched interests that perpetuate colonial power structures.

The combination of these two aspects often result in community disengagement from public life.

Various stakeholders recognized, however, that there is **momentum to revisit and rebalance said partnerships**, such as with the current discourse on decolonizing development, humanitarian aid, and peacebuilding. If shaped inside this new discourse, social contract programming interventions may provide a window of opportunity to reposition local actors, build strong and reliable partnerships and achieve sustainable results, while addressing systemic issues within SRoL and international development. Leveraging on the decolonization discourse to reimagine partnerships implies:

- reviewing how interventions are designed and negotiated (who is around the table and with what power).
- reconsidering their duration (short-term results vs long-term investment).
- rethinking key stakeholders, their roles and the rationale behind them.
- acknowledging the different socio-political factors and power dynamics that, beyond technical capacities, influence the implementation of such interventions.
- valuing and leveraging local knowledge and ‘expertise’.

Final reflections

In this concluding section, we present a few final reflections that consider both the challenges and opportunities of applying a social contract lens to SRoL.

Operationalizing the social contract concept for SRoL policy and programming remains a challenge. The 2022 trajectory cannot claim to have solved this problem, and we consider this issue to be key to deepen during the 2023 trajectory. Nevertheless, we collected below some of the implications for the use of the social contract concept in SRoL that have already emerged.

Be clear about whether the social contract is used as an analytical frame to understand why political order is stable, irrespective of whether it is fair or just to an external observer **or is used as an ideal form of political order to contribute to**. In the latter case, the inclusive social contract concept can be considered.

Because of the complexity and interconnections between aspirational norms and standards and the reality of political relations, external interveners should understand that there are no definitive entry points to strengthen and re-imagine social contracts. They should, instead, **map systems, inside which multiple (or no) entry points could be found to (re)imagine social contracts**. Among questions that are useful for this mapping are:

1. What do people expect from powerholders?
2. Are there multilateral and bilateral policy frameworks that guide relations between donors and partners and provide an ideal of the rights that people could demand of their governments?
3. What was promised by or agreed with whom and to whom to create expectations? What is the role of social norms?
4. Who believes the expectations to be met? And who does not?
5. Why?
6. Do the delivered social contracts work for everyone or only for some?
7. How do powerful actors react to contestation?

Intersectional lenses and granular local knowledge that emerge from within the social fabric of partner countries is essential in mapping systems and entry points as per questions outlined above, recognising that there is unlikely to be consensus on the answers.

The concept of inclusive social contract, which is an option for setting an ideal process of social contract formation, is about **expanding opportunities for all legitimate voices in society to influence policy** and practice in the fields of peace and justice, and to build the opportunities of formal and informal institutions to contributing to delivering such inclusive social contracts.

Interventions should fit locally defined objectives and social contract, and fit local values, norms, and actions. Policymakers might, however, discuss the relationship between local values and norms and other rationale for public action, including equality, human rights, or democratic norms. When discussing partnerships and interventions, policymakers should, however, never presume or assume that values foreign to the societies of intervention should automatically be introduced. Instead, it is key to build on existing plans and available capacities, by scrutinizing first local action plans and assessing window of opportunities and local ownership. Linked to this is the recognition of 'expertise' that come in diverse forms and revalorization of indigenous knowledge and systems.

In using the social contract concept, it should not be forgotten that the transactional approach to build legitimacy, of balance between rights awarded and duties carried out, is not the only possible approaches. Other approaches might emphasise the way in which shared histories, language, ideas, and norms concur to shape the social contract. **The conversation on the role of social norms and values**, and their clashes, inside social contract processes and foreign interventions is another topic that should be continued and deepened in 2023, potentially with a focus on specific social norms and institutions such as patriarchy or ageism.

The social contract lens shows that society is an active system that mixes consensual and dissent relationships, where opinions of fairness and rights evolve. Therefore, there is an important role for foreign interveners to support social and citizen movements emerging from the partner countries to enable them to demand inclusive change and be heard. This requires donors to be more diversified in terms of partnerships by strengthening relations with national and sub-national government counterparts, representative civil society (and NGOs) organizations, but also grassroots movements, social movements, and the private sector. **Supporting social movements in situations of political repression** is another area where the conversation could continue in 2023, including through personal perspectives from communities and activists embedded in processes of social contract formation and contestation.

There is still space and need for **reimagining programming interventions** so that they can provide opportunities to promote inclusive social contracts and responsive institutions at both national and local levels. To reimagine programming interventions that void short-termism and take into consideration that social contract transitions are long-term processes that do not fit into shorter-term programs and funding cycles. From this perspective, the conversation should continue in 2023 also on the connections between social contract support and the decolonisation of aid movement.

Supporting responsive justice, security, and governance institutions that deliver essential functions and enable minimum standards of quality service delivery can be an often crucial entry point. However, supporting the delivery of basic rights and services should not be considered as an isolated goal but as an entry point for broader conversations on the package of exchanges between rights and duties, inclusive politics, and repositioning of local actors. The role of the private sector in delivering on social contracts is still debated and unsettled, including its potential positive role as contributor to justice sector reform and negative role as powerful advocate for self-interested public action (and inaction) is also an area for learning. Perspectives from companies, investors, and trade unions were largely absent from KPAC22. This could therefore be one of the focus areas for 2023.